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The "picoprocess" here seems very similar to Linux's "seccomp" mechanism for restricting the kernel API surface. Current sandboxing mechanisms on Linux (such a
by JoshTriplett 12y ago
The "picoprocess" here seems very similar to Linux's "seccomp" mechanism for restricting the kernel API surface. Current sandboxing mechanisms on Linux (such as Chrome's various sandboxes) use seccomp to restrict almost all syscalls, and their APIs come from IPC to more privileged processes.
Two notable differences:
On the one hand, seccomp provides much more flexibility about the subset of kernel API offered to the process, rather than just saying "here's 45 syscalls".
On the other hand, Drawbridge claims to run unmodified Windows applications; they may have an efficient mechanism for trapping NT "syscalls" and redirecting them to their "user-mode NT kernel" ntoskrnl.dll. However, this might just mean that they run unmodified applications making Win32 library calls, and the libraries have been modified, in which case programs making NT kernel syscalls would not run unmodified.
I'd really like to see a standard mechanism on Linux, similar to the "personality" mechanism, that augments seccomp with an efficient process for defining a new "syscall" layer. That would make sandboxing much simpler and more efficient.
- rayiner 12y agoThis seems to me to be more along the lines of work into exokernels: most of the "kernel" runs as a library in user mode.[1] The application still has a full range of functionality available. The "45 API calls" is not what the user process can access, but the interface between the, untrusted, user-mode kernel and the, secure, kernel-mode kernel. [1] http://research.cs.wisc.edu/areas/os/Qual/papers/exokernel.pdf http://research.cs.wisc.edu/areas/os/Qual/papers/exokernel.p...
- CyberShadow 12y ago> they may have an efficient mechanism for trapping NT "syscalls" I believe this is not really necessary. The syscall ABI is not stable from Windows version to Windows version - ABI stability is instead provided via the userspace DLLs (kernel32, user32 etc.), which are the official API applications are expected to use. Some processes might invoke the syscalls directly, but this is a narrow use case (e.g. security software or copy protection wrappers might use syscalls to bypass userspace API hooks).
- bane 12y agoThis looks like they're actually bundling the kernel and all appropriate libraries into the package. "Persistent Compatibility: allowing host and application to evolve separately. Changes in the host don't break applications." "A library OS is an operating system refactored to run as a set of libraries within the context of an application. While Drawbridge can run many possible library OSes..." This implies to me at least that the app and the "OS" the application sees is a complete isolation from the host OS. But I might be misinterpreting things here, the video seems to go into a better explanation http://channel9.msdn.com/Shows/Going+Deep/Drawbridge-An-Experimental-Library-Operating-System http://channel9.msdn.com/Shows/Going+Deep/Drawbridge-An-Expe... Strategically this could allow Microsoft to drop lots of backwards compatibility cruft in their mainstream host OS and vastly reduce development cost and complexity. See my previous comment here https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=8245682 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=8245682