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3-Mile Island is a very bad example, since no member of the general public was harmed by it (some plant workers got more radiation exposure than they should hav
by pdonis 12y ago
3-Mile Island is a very bad example, since no member of the general public was harmed by it (some plant workers got more radiation exposure than they should have, but nobody who wasn't a plant worker did).
Chernobyl is a bad example too, not because it didn't do harm, but because nobody since the Soviet Union is going to be insane enough to build a plant without secondary containment, or to run uncontrolled experiments with a reactor, or to build a reactor with a positive void coefficient of reactivity.
Fukushima is a somewhat better example, but the engineering that needed to be done better in that case was not nuclear engineering: the problem was siting the backup power generators and switchgear behind a seawall that got overwhelmed by the tsunami. (To be fair, newer reactor designs don't need backup power to cool the reactor after a shutdown; but those designs didn't exist when Fukushima was built.)
Nuclear waste disposal is only a problem if you refuse to reprocess the waste, which only the United States has done among all nuclear-using countries (because of misplaced concerns about proliferation; other countries have been reprocessing for decades and there have been no incidents).
Finally, if you're going to be fair in assessing nuclear power, you have to compare the overall cost of nuclear power with the overall cost of other forms of base load power generation. You have to look at the damage done by coal mining, coal ash and soot (not to mention radioactivity in coal ash, which is actually worse than many forms of nuclear waste), oil spills, fracking for natural gas, etc.
- Lazare 12y agoGood point about Fukushima. People often forget that there was a reactor closer to the earthquake that got hit by an even bigger tsunami which survived just fine... ...because they'd built a sensibly sized sea wall. I'm all for learning lessons from Fukushima, but the lesson basically seems to be "don't put reactors on the coast without big sea walls".
- throwaway5752 12y agoPerhaps the lesson is that reactors are just about the most complicated construction projects that humans build, they continuously operate on the edge of disaster, and they require a huge number of highly educated operators. There are too many factors to assure they will be safe, and their failure mode can reach catastrophic levels. As you obviously know, the Fukushima disaster was not because of quake or tsunami damage to the reactors. It was because of water damage to the diesel generators that circulated the coolant to remove decay heat. Then failures in 3 (4?) redundant backup measure to provide that power occured, too. What would happen, hypothetically in the event of an human generated EMP (or general infrastructure because of war) or a multi-stdev CME from the sun? What if a sufficiently dedicated group was able to infiltrate a reactor and intentionally damage it? There's always a way to imagine a failure scenario that is possible, even if unlikely. Thankfully Fukushima wasn't nearly as bad as Chernobyl. Had the fuel breached the containment unit and triggered a steam explosion with groundwater. it would have been worse.
- power_rated 12y agoor just the wind blown in another direction, so that the fallout happend over the Japanese homeland and not the sea.
- pdonis 12y ago> they continuously operate on the edge of disaster No, they don't. > they require a huge number of highly educated operators. Older designs, like Fukushima, do require operators to take certain actions in the event of failure in order to prevent damage to the reactor. (Newer designs don't even require that, which is certainly an improvement; but that doesn't mean we should misrepresent the features of older designs.) But they do not require operators to take certain actions in the event of failure to prevent radiation release to the outside world. They just require backup power. (Again, newer designs don't even require backup power, which, again, is certainly an improvement. But that doesn't mean we should misrepresent the features of older designs. As another poster noted, a similar reactor even closer to the tsunami had no problems--because the backup power generators were sited properly.) > There are too many factors to assure they will be safe, and their failure mode can reach catastrophic levels. This is not true either. Even if we grant that Fukushima has harmed many people, the main reasons for that harm were unrelated to the reactor itself: they were the bad siting of the backup power, and the fact that TEPCO and the Japanese government refused to admit what was really going on and take proper steps to contain it, including asking for help. The same sorts of human errors have caused much more harm in connection with other technologies--for example, consider the people harmed due to coal mining (several orders of magnitude more than those harmed due to nuclear energy). > There's always a way to imagine a failure scenario that is possible, even if unlikely. Sure, and this is true of any technology. But just imagining the failure scenario doesn't quantify the risk, and it's the quantitative risk that you need in order to make a fair assessment of the technology.
- throwaway5752 12y agoI'm no friend of coal and would prefer nuclear to it. I prefer solar to both. I can't go on at length responding to you - too much time on this thread and only so many hours in life^H^H^H^Hthe day. However, I think you really know the issues but are approaching it from a slightly contrarian tack. I think it's very fair to say reactors operate on the edge of disaster. But I say that in the same sense that motorcycles operate on the edge of disaster (for the rider). It's the controlled fission of a super critical amount of enriched uranium. Even if there is a hypothetically perfect reactor, imperfect people with build it, run it, make decisions about it, and design/implement the risk control protocols around it. Just look at a few of the almost infinite examples of human factors mistakes in complex systems: Colgan 3407, Air France 447, Chernobyl, Challenger... I would even be kinder to Fukushim Daiichi because 1) the risk at the site was not as well known at the time of construction 2) there were backup power sources beyond the diesel generators that failed 3) most damage was not preventable after the wave hit whether help was requested or not. People are the weak link and we're pretty much intrinsic to the process.
- alexbecker 12y agoI agree with all of your points except nuclear reprocessing. It is overall worthwhile, but it is far from inherently safe. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kyshtym_disaster http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kyshtym_disaster, which was a level-6 incident, i.e. the third worst in history (probably actually the second). Granted, it was the Russians.
- pdonis 12y ago> it was the Russians. Exactly. Also, it happened in 1957, when nobody really knew a lot about how to reprocess properly--but unlike the Russians, everybody else recognized that and worked on getting it right.