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I can hardly agree with you. 1. On historical science. The process of science has changed drastically over the centuries. To discover the law of gravitation, a

I can hardly agree with you. 1. On historical science. The process of science has changed drastically over the centuries. To discover the law of gravitation, a few people with telescopes had to tabulate a few thousand data points, do some manipulations and discover the law. For the search of the Higgs, eg. the statistical procedures to be used where established well in advance of data collection to avoid potential biases. The idea is that more advanced science requires more careful procedures and analysis. Rovelli is arguing that we need to change our method yet again towards being more careful and formal to make advances. 2. Your first paragraph is a strawman. There is much more to the philosophy of science than your examples. See [1]. Or consider that "what is probability?" does not have a good answer. This is a question that philosophy struggles with and that has deep relevance to physics - eg. the ontology of quantum mechanics. [1] http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2014/02/24/post-debate-reflections/ http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2014/02/24/post-deb...

lmm 12y ago
> There is much more to the philosophy of science than your examples. See [1]. Or consider that "what is probability?" does not have a good answer. This is a question that philosophy struggles with and that has deep relevance to physics - eg. the ontology of quantum mechanics. What is the relevance? We're able to make accurate experimental predictions about probability already - theorising about "what is probability?" could just be meaningless speculation unconnected to reality, which is exactly his problem with String Theory. No?
loup-vaillant 12y ago
> Or consider that "what is probability?" does not have a good answer. I have read this awnser¹, and it certainly looks good. Perhaps even kind of obvious. http://bayes.wustl.edu/etj/prob/book.pdf http://bayes.wustl.edu/etj/prob/book.pdf
- loup-vaillant 12y ago
  Maybe I should explain. One cannot reasonably say that "what is a probability?" doesn't have a good answer without having read at least the first two chapters of "Probability Theory: the Logic of Science". I don't want to enter a Frequentist/Bayesian debate, where I'm right and the Frequentists are insane. But the views presented on this book didn't really surprise or enlighten me¹. Instead, I was more like "of course, why the fuss?" Many of the claims in this book really did felt obvious. "What is a probability?" does have a good answer. Anyone saying otherwise should probably look at it, and explain why it's not good. I personally don't expect strong counter-arguments. (And if one throws me the problem of priors again, I'll crush him under the sheer weight of the hidden priors we can find in Frequentist methods.) [1] With one big exception: the consistency proofs. I didn't know we could derive Probability Theory from so few axioms.

lmm 12y ago

> There is much more to the philosophy of science than your examples. See [1]. Or consider that "what is probability?" does not have a good answer. This is a question that philosophy struggles with and that has deep relevance to physics - eg. the ontology of quantum mechanics. What is the relevance? We're able to make accurate experimental predictions about probability already - theorising about "what is probability?" could just be meaningless speculation unconnected to reality, which is exactly his problem with String Theory. No?

loup-vaillant 12y ago

> Or consider that "what is probability?" does not have a good answer. I have read this awnser¹, and it certainly looks good. Perhaps even kind of obvious. http://bayes.wustl.edu/etj/prob/book.pdf http://bayes.wustl.edu/etj/prob/book.pdf

loup-vaillant 12y ago
Maybe I should explain. One cannot reasonably say that "what is a probability?" doesn't have a good answer without having read at least the first two chapters of "Probability Theory: the Logic of Science". I don't want to enter a Frequentist/Bayesian debate, where I'm right and the Frequentists are insane. But the views presented on this book didn't really surprise or enlighten me¹. Instead, I was more like "of course, why the fuss?" Many of the claims in this book really did felt obvious. "What is a probability?" does have a good answer. Anyone saying otherwise should probably look at it, and explain why it's not good. I personally don't expect strong counter-arguments. (And if one throws me the problem of priors again, I'll crush him under the sheer weight of the hidden priors we can find in Frequentist methods.) [1] With one big exception: the consistency proofs. I didn't know we could derive Probability Theory from so few axioms.