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Interesting. It has bugged me for some time that if the Web of Trust was bigger, it could grow exponentially and become universal: once someone you personally k
by IgorPartola 12y ago
Interesting. It has bugged me for some time that if the Web of Trust was bigger, it could grow exponentially and become universal: once someone you personally know has entered you into the WoT, you can be trusted and can trust others based on a number of public signatures on their public key. However, currently the WoT is so sparse that you cannot do this.
My idea was to use the existing web TLS platform to bootstrap the WoT to a sufficiently large level. I run my email on my own domain. Why can't I tell the WoT (and have it trust that it is true) that my public key is XYZ by putting it at https://igorpartola.com/pub.pem https://igorpartola.com/pub.pem? GMail could do something similar and at least to start, we could get enough emails validated to start having the WoT spread on its own. Then we could modify the infrastructure to remove the public CA's and central authority entirely, by using the WoT itself. Google's HTTPS cert would then be based on its PGP key and be verified by humans inside the WoT.
I also think that the important part of the WoT is verifying emails/digital identity, not government docs. I don't care if I am talking to "Bob Bobber", I care that I am talking to bob@bobber.com. I may never have met bob@bobber.com, but I see his/her public git repos, blog, etc. and I want to connect to them securely.
- kleiba 12y agoLet's not forget that one of the most successful attack vectors is social engineering, that is, tricking people into trusting you and making you part of the WoT.
- XorNot 12y agoThat's what key revocation is about though: its an assumption that the WoT will get things wrong, but that we'll be able to retroactively undo some problems. Conversely, it is why anonymity is an orthogonal goal for non-realtime communications.
- IgorPartola 12y agoSure. But if you are willing to trust some CA to issue me a HTTPS cert for my domain, why are you not willing to trust that I serve my public key for this domain suing this HTTPS cert to secure its transport? Oh, sure some adversary could gain control of the web server used for this and replace my pub.pem, but then I will notice and revoke it. And once enough people download and sign my pub.pem, it no longer matters: I am now in the WoT and can remove pub.pem.
- blueskin_ 12y agoI think the issue is that a lot of people who are informed about CAs don't trust them, but we still don't have anything better that's anywhere even close to wide adoption.
- blueskin_ 12y agoSolvable by only ever issuing marginal trust (technically, if enough people get social engineered in, that still causes a problem, but that's a lot harder than a single person. Trusting above marginal level should be reserved for very few people if any at all. I don't have anyone with full trust.
- mike_hearn 12y agoYour server is already publishing a public key - in the certificate. "Humans" at the CA verified it. What you're really arguing for is some army of volunteer CAs to do it (this is the WoT model summed up). However verifying identities is not fun, takes knowledge and skill to defend your private keys, and in the absence of payment will attract only a tiny number of uber-geeks who think the word "party" is a reasonable word to describe a bulk ID verification ceremony ;) This is why the WoT is a bust and nobody developing new crypto systems cares about it anymore.
- phkahler 12y ago>> This is why the WoT is a bust and nobody developing new crypto systems cares about it anymore. I think the real reason nobody cares about it is because it gives you actual privacy. There is no way to exploit it commercially. All they could get is that data went "from here to there" with no idea what was in it. Not even Google could target ads with that.
- schoen 12y agoI've met plenty of non-profit privacy activists who share Mike's pessimism about web of trust authentication.