3 ms·
DANE is about 500x better than the current CA model, using your estimation. All CAs are allowed to issue certificates for almost every (not entirely true, but p
by xorcist 12y ago
DANE is about 500x better than the current CA model, using your estimation. All CAs are allowed to issue certificates for almost every (not entirely true, but pretty much so) domain, while only one top domain is involved in DANE trust.
I don't need to trust the Iranian top domain (which is what you mean, not "government") for all of the web that is not in .ir. I don't know about you, but 100% of my web use falls in that bucket.
And if you want to visit an .ir domain you need to trust the Iranian domain registry, independently if you use CAs, DANE or even Convergence. If they change the legitimate owner of the domain (which is what you mean here!), they can just as easily get a legitimate SSL certificate in every trust model in practical use.
(Indeed, if a legitimate owner of a domain couldn't get a legitimate certificate, there'd be no possibility to do things like rotate your keys and change your certificate. That would be an even bigger problem than broken CAs.)
So DANE makes sense. And while there are known issues with DNSSEC, trusting governments is not one of them. Not more so than with any other model.