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OCSP is still useful, it's just not panacea. Getting timely notification that cert A is invalid or that server B should no longer be using cert A is still good
by Pxtl 12y ago
OCSP is still useful, it's just not panacea. Getting timely notification that cert A is invalid or that server B should no longer be using cert A is still good. It doesn't solve every problem (like somebody blocking access to the CA to prevent the OCSP check) but it's not worthless.
It can be defeated if the user or his ISP is pwned. It might kick in too late to properly save the user if the connection to the CA is too slow.
But it still does nicely handle the case where a server and its cert are no longer trustworthy.
- tptacek 12y agoOCSP mitigates attacks by adversaries who control cryptographic secrets and connectivity (or else those secrets don't do any good). It's defeated trivially by manipulating connectivity just enough to break OCSP. It's not useful at all. This is a common pathology when thinking about security. Lots of things appear to work when they aren't being tested by a real attacker, but don't work at all when they are. It's like an insurance policy that you pay small premiums to that then vanishes when a disaster strikes. Like I said upthread: there's a way to make something like OCSP work: the OCSP signaling can be moved in-band, so it can't be attacked separately from the TLS session itself, and then made sticky through an HSTS-like mechanism. But until OCSP gets a "Must-Staple" mechanism, it provides literally no real benefit.
- Pxtl 12y agoObviously stapling improves on OCSP, and OCSP is flawed. But OCSP is better than nothing. It's not 100% useless - if a server or a cert has been owned, OCSP will protect the user from that. If the user has been owned, only stapling will save them, so obviously a move towards stapling is a good idea. But don't let the perfect be the enemy of the "better than nothing".