4 ms·
OSCP fails often enough that requiring a verified pass would break the internet. Thus, browsers which support OSCP treat a failure to fetch OSCP data as a soft
by danudey 12y ago
OSCP fails often enough that requiring a verified pass would break the internet. Thus, browsers which support OSCP treat a failure to fetch OSCP data as a soft fail (i.e. they ignore it).
The problem is that if you can MITM someone, you can deny them access to the OSCP service and cause a soft fail, which makes OSCP worthless.
- Pxtl 12y agoJust because it doesn't stop a full MITM between the CA and the client doesn't make it worthless. It still protects the user from trusting a server that is no longer trustworthy. If a certificate is worth issuing when a server is trustworthy, it's worth revoking when the server loses that trust.
- tptacek 12y agoWe are talking about adversaries who control both secrets and connectivity. Not because those are the adversaries we care most about, but because those are the adversaries that key revocation contemplates. The notion of "full MITM" versus "partial MITM" versus "passive-only" attacker does not apply.