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I wonder how this is going to work. I've been using an add-on to pin certificates for a half a year now and it's a hell on some websites. It nicely worked for m
by lucb1e 12y ago
I wonder how this is going to work. I've been using an add-on to pin certificates for a half a year now and it's a hell on some websites. It nicely worked for my bank for a while, but they now employ the same technique as Google, Twitter, Facebook, Akamai, etc., changing certificates and even their CA seemingly at random. You'd think I'm being MITM'd but I'm pretty sure that's not actually the case.
Edit: I should read more closely, found it:
> the list of acceptable certificate authorities must be set at time of build for each pinned domain.
So it's directly in Firefox' source code right now. Pretty much useless for anyone but a few big sites.
And the pinning RFC doesn't sound much better. It makes the client store something about sites they visited, which roughly translates to supercookies.
- Someone1234 12y ago> And the pinning RFC doesn't sound much better. It makes the client store something about sites they visited, which roughly translates to supercookies. I don't follow. If the user visits a site for the first time (ever) over a secure connection, they will become much more resilient to MITM for all future connections (including the ones where it updates). That's a win in my book. At least it is a win from the "hacker" MiTM threat. It won't be as useful against states/governments since there might never be a secure connection ever. But I'd take a solution NOW that works-ish than a solution maybe never which is flawless. Security in depth and all that jazz. The ultimate solution is some kind of secure DNS infrastructure which delivers information about HTTP certificates (which I believe is in the works also).
- lucb1e 12y agoI'm not saying it's entirely bad, but it's something some users will want to disable for privacy concerns. The current model works well enough to allow widespread online banking and although this RFC will certainly make it more secure, there are also disadvantages. I happen to know that Chrome hardcodes a list of EV certificates (or at least I read so a while ago), it could do the same for CAs. Or the browser could ask a central server which CA belongs to a certificate fingerprint. Not that different from OSCP except that it'll probably be run by the browser manufacturer instead of the CA.
- xorcist 12y ago> If the user visits a site for the first time (ever) over a secure connection, they will become much more resilient to MITM for all future connections .. as long as the site never cycles their certificates, and bugs such as Heartbleed never forces them to. Not a win in my book. In practice, this will be either useless or amount to a tiny nagscreen that users click through with their brains on autopilot.
- rjbrock 12y agoThis isn't really intended for the end user to use. This is for a web service to let Mozilla know that they will only use XXX root CA to issue their certs, and Firefox then only trusts valid SSL certs from the proper root CA for that web service. Google has had pinning enabled in chrome for their own properties for a while (and some others now I believe). In fact that is how they detected an intrusion in one of the other Root CAs
- lucb1e 12y ago> In fact that is how they detected an intrusion in one of the other Root CAs I know that and that's great, but why only Google? Sure it is Chrome we're talking about, but it is still a mainstream browser. They could make it a bit more neutral by including, say, https-enabled sites from the Alexa top 10k. > This isn't really intended for the end user to use. Of course, what I meant was how small websites will get their sites secured. Do we have to do a pull request for every browser out there every time we order a new certificate? It doesn't seem manageable for the developers nor the browser builders.
- rjbrock 12y agoWell nothing is stopping a top site from changing their Root CA, so it would be impossible to ship pinned certificates without coordination between Google and the site.
- sbierwagen 12y agoAnd the pinning RFC doesn't sound much better. It makes the client store something about sites they visited, which roughly translates to supercookies. So what? The server can't read it back out of the client store again. The comparison to cookies is completely spurious.
- lucb1e 12y ago> The server can't read it back out of the client store again. Actually it can, by making the client connect to various subdomains with various certificates (valid or not). Like with image caches and everything else that supercookies use, something that is meant to be cached between requests is always detectable. > spurious Nice day to you, too...
- sbierwagen 12y agoOkay, maybe not entirely spurious, but how much information can a malicious tracker actually extract using HPKP + invalid certs, and the resulting failed handshake? 1. The client is new enough that it supports HPKP (information you get from the default UA string anyway, but could be used to smoke out someone using a blank UA string) 2. The client has connected to this server once before. That's, what, one bit? A bit and a half? You could add a new subdomain once a day, then invalidate the cert 24 hours later, to get more bits of information, but this is an attack that requires buying a new cert once a day, forever, which costs money. (StartSSL gives you one free cert, but only one) (It wouldn't cost a state sponsored attacker any money to create certs, of course...) Is there even any way to implement PKP that wouldn't leak client information via failed handshakes? Is killing pervasive monitoring worth enabling an expensive supercookie attack? (One dumb mitigation: ignore handshake failures due to PKP, proceed with the connection as normal, but throw away the data. You'd have to load and parse the requested page in the background, though, or else the attacker would notice that the client isn't requesting inline images/scripts...) --- EDIT: Ah, the draft mentions the supercookie attack: http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning-20#page-20 http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning-20#...
- 12y ago
- PhantomGremlin 12y ago> I've been using an add-on to pin certificates for a half a year now and it's a hell on some websites. Do you mean Certificate Patrol? I also tried it and have given up. Way too "noisy". Let's hope that Firefox eventually implements a more refined solution.