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> But I suspect it's only a matter of time before the FBI/CIA/NSA (or local PD) will be able to unilaterally decide it's in the "public interest" to suddenly sh
by tzs 12y ago
> But I suspect it's only a matter of time before the FBI/CIA/NSA (or local PD) will be able to unilaterally decide it's in the "public interest" to suddenly shut off every phone in a particular geofence.
This would be an ineffective way to accomplish that. They'd first have to make a list of all the phones in the target area, and then they'd have to send the lock commands to them, one by one.
Furthermore, even if they went through all that trouble, it only would work on smartphones. The bill does not apply to feature phones, other non-smartphone phones, laptops, or tablets. The bill defines a "smartphone" as a cellular radio telephone or other mobile voice communications handset that includes ALL of the following features:
• Utilizes a mobile operating system.
• Possess the capability to utilize mobile software applications, access and browse the Internet, utilize text messaging, utilize digital voice service, and send and receive email.
• Has wireless network connectivity.
• Is capable of operating on a long-term evolution network or successor wireless data network communications standards.
The bill explicitly says that "smartphone" does not "include a radio cellular telephone commonly referred to as a 'feature' or 'messaging' telephone, a laptop, a tablet device, or a device that only has electronic reading capability".
(Added in edit) Also, while the bill requires that smartphones be equipped with this and that it be on by default, the bill does NOT require that it stay on. Apple's iOS 7 kill switch lets the user turn it off, and I believe that is what Samsung plans to do. People going to protests or other events where they think authorities may try to disrupt communications can simply turn off the kill switch before arriving at the protest.
It would be much more effective to silence a particular area by doing something at the cell tower layer or higher.
> I have a hard time believing that stolen phones are a big enough social problem to warrant a mandate of this scope
Stolen phones account for half of all robberies in San Francisco. In New York, they are 20% and rapidly rising. It's the #1 property crime nationwide, accounting for 1/3 of all property crime. In half of the San Francisco incidents the victims are punched, kicked, or physically intimidated, and in a quarter of them they are threatened with a gun or knife.
That sure seems like a big enough problem to me to try to do something about. We also know that kill switches are effective. In the first five months after Apple put in a kill switch, iPhone thefts dropped 38% in San Francisco, 24% in London, and 19% in New York. We know this wasn't just due to a general lowing of crime rates, because in the same time period overall New York theft went down 10%, and Samsung phone theft went up 40%.
- ClassicFarris 12y ago> … We also know that kill switches are effective… Do you have a source to back up the stats in this section? > This would be an ineffective way to accomplish that. They'd first have to make a list of all the phones in the target area, and then they'd have to send the lock commands to them, one by one. This doesn't seem to hard, if you have all of the phones connecting to one or two towers (Or you set up your own "Stingray" tower). Now the standard line before a protest speech will be, "Please turn your phones to silent, and turn off the kill switch please..."
- tzs 12y agoSome sources: http://blogs.wsj.com/metropolis/2014/03/03/new-york-bill-would-require-smartphone-kill-switch/ http://blogs.wsj.com/metropolis/2014/03/03/new-york-bill-wou... http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/USA-Update/2014/0515/Minnesota-passes-first-in-nation-smart-phone-kill-switch-law-video http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/USA-Update/2014/0515/Minnesota-... http://phonetheftfacts.com/facts-and-information/recent-news/PostId/67 http://phonetheftfacts.com/facts-and-information/recent-news... http://blogs.findlaw.com/technologist/2014/06/iphone-thefts-plummet-after-apples-kill-switch-introduced.html http://blogs.findlaw.com/technologist/2014/06/iphone-thefts-... http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/kill-switch-lowers-iphone-thefts-article-1.1835567 http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/kill-switch-lowers-iphon...
- ccvannorman 12y ago>>This would be an ineffective way to accomplish that. They'd first have to make a list of all the phones in the target area, and then they'd have to send the lock commands to them, one by one. Phone[] phones = GetPhonesByGeo(radius=50, lat=102.23412323, lon=-129.4342424); foreach(Phone p in phones) { p.sendmessage("Lock"); } func GetPhonesByGeo(){ // your tax dollars at work }
- tzs 12y agoYou need to determine how to send the message to the phone. Flipping the kill switch on an iPhone will require talking to Apple, for instance, whereas I'm pretty sure you would not talk to Apple to flip the kill switch on a Samsung phone. There will be at a minimum three different mechanisms you'd have to deal with (Apple, Google if they build this into Android and all Android phone makers and carriers leave it in place instead of replacing it with their own version, and Microsoft). There could be dozens if Android phone makers go their own way, or if the phone carriers customize the firmware to replace the kill switch from the hardware maker or Google with their own. There is no requirement that an API be provided to law enforcement. That "sendmessage" method could come down to someone on the law enforcement side getting on the phone with Apple or Google or Microsoft or a service provider and telling them the numbers to kill. This is assuming that Apple or Google or whoever even can flip the kill switch without the assistance of the phone's authorized user. They could easily design the kill switch system so that the person flipping the switch has to know the authorized user's password [1]. There is nothing in the bill that I see that says they have to design the kill mechanism to allow law enforcement or the manufacturer or the carrier to be able to use it. [1] For instance, the phone could ask for your iCloud or Google account information when you set up the kill switch for the first time, and then it could store on the phone a hash of the concatenation of your password and the phone serial number. The kill switch mechanism could require that the kill command include that hash, thus proving to the phone that the sender had access to your password.