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Lavabit was forced to close down in August 2013, after being forced to disclose classified documents. Sigh! No it was not. They where forced to hand over the
by CaptainZapp 12y ago
Lavabit was forced to close down in August 2013, after being forced to disclose classified documents.
Sigh!
No it was not. They where forced to hand over the private server keys, which is much more significant than "disclosing some classified documents" and so Mr. Levison decided to shut it down.
It may be just a pet peevee of mine, but can't journalists do some minimal research before writing about a subject?
- riquito 12y agoThe article is meant for non tech people, why should the journalist go into such details? You may also consider the server's private key a "classified document", by the way.
- BillFranklin 12y agoThe article originally appeared in the German WSJ, so some of the more intricate parts of the story may have been lost in translation. The original article: http://www.wsj.de/nachrichten/SB10001424052702304099004580091422159848964?mg=reno64-wsjde http://www.wsj.de/nachrichten/SB1000142405270230409900458009...
- Braunbart 12y agoYep, in the german version it says "Anfang des Jahres verklagte die US-Regierung Lavabit auf Herausgabe ihrer SSL-Schlüssel und gewann den Prozess." So there they wrote about the correct technical details.
- CaptainZapp 12y agoThanks for the link (grand parent) and the posting of the original text. You're correct; the original is rather accurate. Chalk it up to sloppy translation :)
- nodata 12y agoMr Levison believed that shutting it down was the only decent option available, so he _was_ forced to shut it down...
- tptacek 12y agoIt's worth remembering that he was forced to shut it down because he designed it in a way that made it not just possible but inevitable that the DOJ would eventually get a court order for keys. There is no transition in the investigative state machine for "data relevant to our investigation to which we are lawfully entitled exists and is available to us, BUT we will not retrieve it because doing so would be invasive to other members of the service". It's possible --- we could do some research --- that that transition exists in the state machines of no western government at all. Knowing that: if it's feasible to obtain information from a secure message service, eventually, the courts will mandate its retrieval. As of 2014, there is a fundamental tradeoff that we know for a fact exists: you can design an encrypted mail service that is trivial for users to adopt, or you can design an encrypted mail service that meaningfully resists judicial power. You can't do both.
- jeffrey8chang 12y agoYes, you can design an encryption tool that's both trivial to adopt, and resist judicial power at the same time. And this is exactly what I'm doing now: https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/620001568/jackpair-safeguard-your-phone-conversation https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/620001568/jackpair-safe... It's an end-to-end voice encryption device using Diffie-Hellman protocol for completely-distributed key exchange, so the keys never leave the box and there's no way we can hand over any key, or traffic, to the authorities. The user interface of JackPair is minimal; it's connected with any phone and headset through standard 3.5 mm audio jack. All you need to do is to press the button on it to set up secure line over established phone calls. It's zero configuration with no software to install, no service subscription, and it works with any phone you already have.
- danielweber 12y ago