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It is not just ccTLD, the writ of attachment applies to IP prefixes allocated for Islamic Republic of Iran as well. >But there are other possibilities, Darshan
by EthanHeilman 12y ago
It is not just ccTLD, the writ of attachment applies to IP prefixes allocated for Islamic Republic of Iran as well.
>But there are other possibilities, Darshan-Leitner said. “ICANN may decide that it just isn’t worth their while to do business with Iran anymore, because all the money coming in will go to the terror victims.” In that case, Darshan-Leitner said, ICANN could “pull the plug” on Iran’s Internet, suspending use of the .ir domain and disconnecting Iranian IP addresses from the web. Even if ICANN decided not to do that, Shurat Hadin could demand an auction of the Iranian Internet assets, arguing that it could realize more compensation money that way – meaning that Iran would no longer be in control of its own websites. http://www.timesofisrael.com/israeli-us-terror-victims-now-own-irans-internet/ http://www.timesofisrael.com/israeli-us-terror-victims-now-o...
>Plaintiffs hold several money judgments against the governments of Iran, Syria and North Korea (collectively, the “defendants”). Plaintiffs endeavor, with the Writs of Attachment, to attach the .IR, .SY and .KP country code top-level domains (“ccTLDs”), related non-ASCII ccTLDs, and supporting IP addresses (collectively, the “.IR, .SY and .KP ccTLDs”), all of whichrepresent a space on the Internet for use by the citizens of Iran, Syria and North Korea. - https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/ben-haim-motion-to-quash-writs-1-29jul14-en.pdf https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/ben-haim-motion-...
- kornholi 12y agowell, they can't really take away their IP space.
- EthanHeilman 12y agoThe could seize IP space using a security system, which began deployment three years ago, called the RPKI[1]. If you use the RPKI to protect the internet against BGP attacks, you provide a technical mechanism which governments, or other actors, could use to seize addresses. I just presented a paper on this[2]. IP takedowns are a risk, the Iranian case is not the only example, for instance RIPE was ordered to seize IP Space by a dutch court[3]. [1]: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Resource_Public_Key_Infrastructure http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Resource_Public_Key_Infrastruct... [2]: See paper "From the Consent of the Routed" http://www.cs.bu.edu/~goldbe/papers/RPKImanip.html http://www.cs.bu.edu/~goldbe/papers/RPKImanip.html [3]: http://www.internetgovernance.org/2013/08/09/court-says-ripe-ncc-has-no-standing-in-ghostclick-case/ http://www.internetgovernance.org/2013/08/09/court-says-ripe...