4 ms·
We shouldn't even allow the intelligence community to know who is talking to each other, or who is talking secretly. We should give cover to legitimate secrecy
by andrewljohnson 12y ago
We shouldn't even allow the intelligence community to know who is talking to each other, or who is talking secretly. We should give cover to legitimate secrecy (political dissent for example) through our collective encrypted babble.
Please do encrypt all the things. It may take some more years of engineering to lock things down to the extent a new HeartBleed isn't always happening, but it's worth the effort.
One citizen's lolcats should look just like another citizen's rebellion.
- Justsignedup 12y agoWell put. How can anyone talk about rebellion when consequence could be torture/death. The internet provides a great communication medium and anti-propaganda anti-censorship mechanisms. Encryption and misdirection is key.
- AlyssaRowan 12y agoThis, all the way. Gotta disagree with you here, Ted, and I note you changed your position a bit in the later post: http://www.tedunangst.com/flak/post/in-defense-of-opportunistic-encryption http://www.tedunangst.com/flak/post/in-defense-of-opportunis... For what it's worth, I had to use https: to check that from my phone because my provider uses a HTTP transparent proxy (otherwise known as a man-in-the-middle!) - and it's down. (How very unfortunate. Perhaps it should know better than to try and parse my traffic.) And you had a certificate signed by your own CA, and that's no real bother when the link was http: in the first place. I was only able to read your blog because you used OE. Poetic. But I know that every connection I make, GCHQ is a passive MITM on at least one hop. That's more pervasive than a coffee-shop Wifi - and they can inject things into plaintext traffic, too. You think DANE's going to be a problem? I don't think so. It's at least as good as domain-validated certs with a CA - which isn't very good, but it's a reasonable minimum. It helps with pinning.