4 ms·
It's hard to see what benefit that would offer. Non-authenticated TLS is trivially vulnerable to MITM attacks. This is especially the case because I can't fores
by matthewmacleod 12y ago
It's hard to see what benefit that would offer. Non-authenticated TLS is trivially vulnerable to MITM attacks. This is especially the case because I can't foresee a situation in which a website would put the effort in to implement opportunistic TLS, but not implement straightforward authenticated HTTPS…
- TazeTSchnitzel 12y agoIt completely prevents passive surveillance, however. Sure, you can MITM, but the point is now to look at anything you have to do an MITM attack, unlike now, where most traffic is unencrypted and you can do surveillance passively. This makes surveillance more difficult. Net gain for everyone.
- matthewmacleod 12y agoI'll concede that passive surveillance would not be possible. However, I think that benefit is marginal - AFAIK, unencrypted support in HTTP2 is optional and won't be supported by browsers in any case.
- jessaustin 12y agoNon-authenticated TLS is trivially vulnerable to MITM attacks. I don't think a well-implemented TOFU/POP policy would be "trivially vulnerable", but it would still accommodate self-signing. Standardizing this would have been a worthy goal for IETF.
- TazeTSchnitzel 12y agoI'd argue that even if it is MITM-vulnerable, it's still very useful, as it makes passive surveillance impossible.
- tmorton 12y agoThis article has a great response to that argument: https://www.tbray.org/ongoing/When/201x/2014/07/28/Privacy-Economics https://www.tbray.org/ongoing/When/201x/2014/07/28/Privacy-E...