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Yeah. This kind of network also cannot truly be partition tolerant, not if the partition is between the two nodes that are trying to establish a connection! T
by comex 12y ago
Yeah. This kind of network also cannot truly be partition tolerant, not if the partition is between the two nodes that are trying to establish a connection!
The article is fairly vague - what is the risk of Sybil attacks exactly? (I looked at the FAQ, but it's sparse on details; only glanced at source.)
Is it some kind of spoofing? Since addresses are supposed to be collision resistant and tied to public keys, it should be possible to discard all messages regarding a peer that don't come from it. Although 40 bits is actually way too small...
Denial of service by pretending to be able to route to a user? Okay, but there should be some way to punish IP addresses that consistently fail to route things they claim to be able to... complicated, but not impossible.
Of course, I've only thought about this for 10 minutes, while the author has studied it for a long time. I'm sure they have more insight about the problems, but without more details I can only speculate.
- PeterisP 12y agoIf you allow the nodes themselves to determine which nodes are trustworthy (instead of a centralized solution), then an example Sybil attack would be a botnet with a huge amount of identities managing to either vote that Botnode12345 is totally trustworthy, and that all data should be sent to it, or that NiceGuyGreg, comex, peterisp and a bunch of other nodes "consistently fail to route things they claim to be able to". Both ways can make the system unusable.