2 ms·
Nope, that's just delegating the problem to the trust chain - it assumes that the TPM does as it should be; and that noone in the chain ever signs anything wron
by PeterisP 12y ago
Nope, that's just delegating the problem to the trust chain - it assumes that the TPM does as it should be; and that noone in the chain ever signs anything wrong. That assumption is obviously wrong, there are many public incidents that show that the core signing keys of pretty much any 'trusted organization' can be used by three letter agencies to sign malicious code as, say, valid windows updates; and that both hardware and OS should be assumed to contain backdoors - especially in the TPM chain.
In addition, having a true and valid hash of my OS, software and config doesn't give you any true assurance - a security hole in that software or OS can easily give an ability to execute arbitrary code, so the "proper configuration" can behave in whatever way, despite being verified. That's what I meant by saying that you can't be sure if it's not doing anything bad, even if you completely control the node - if the underlying math ensures that reading or altering X isn't possible, then it's okay; but otherwise you have to hope/trust that it doesn't. This is meant by zero-knowledge systems as opposed to 'secure' systems that simply ignore knowledge that they shouldn't look at.
- walterbell 12y ago> a security hole in that software or OS can easily give an ability to execute arbitrary code > if the underlying math ensures that reading or altering X isn't possible, then it's okay If an attacker has access to a zero-day exploit that can compromise the OS, could they compromise random generation of numbers and weaken the zero-knowledge system?
- PeterisP 12y agoThey can weaken your part of the system by compromising your machine or your keys, but compromising the centralized node (either by an exploit or a subpoena) shouldn't change anything if that system is zero-knowledge; a compromised node can do no more than an actively malicious node.