3 ms·
>If I should instead shape every contract with a 20% hedge that assumes the counter party will not keep their word, doesn't that introduce a significant amount
by nabla9 12y ago
>If I should instead shape every contract with a 20% hedge that assumes the counter party will not keep their word, doesn't that introduce a significant amount of inefficiency in the entire system.
Of course it does and it should, because there is real risks involved. Banks make their money by evaluating risks correctly.
>For systemic risk to be properly moderated, the individuals or even individual counties must suffer the consequences of their actions. You can opt to not allow this, but you ultimately suffer as a whole when you do.
This would only work if the parties involved would be fully rational. As long as you have imperfect actors with limited information that have limited ability to learn lessons, optimum way to limit the risk for borrower is by bankruptcy laws and procedures so that everyone involved knows the risks.
There was solid international effort to deal with the situation during the Argentine Great Depression and IMF was involved in making the deal. Because there is no bankruptcy law for countries, it was impossible to negotiate bankruptcy deal for Argentine that would bind everyone. These hedge funds are exploiting this. Going forward, we should make example of them. If majority of debtors agree, better to take the deal. This would generate de facto bankruptcy procedure.