4 ms·
Great point -- that is 101 of any serious security equipment validation. It is not that this software package/app or that card and so on are certified. The whol
by rdtsc 12y ago
Great point -- that is 101 of any serious security equipment validation. It is not that this software package/app or that card and so on are certified. The whole package from ground up (hardware components down to analog bits, EM emission... up to top level application get certified as secure) has to be.
I can't buy some mathematically proven secure software, install it on a Chinese tablet and claim it is secure and expect it to get approved.
This is a funny market as some domestic analog components are hard to find today. Micron, I think, makes some but heck most are sourced from China.
This makes 'secure' hardware ridiculously expensive. As in $50k+ for switches and routers and there is a whole market specializing in it.
Now, one can look at it another way -- some security is better than no security. I can see the argument on both sides. At least if NSA can record my phone calls maybe the local cops can't and so on...
- walterbell 12y agoUse separate devices: one with SIM/baseband, one without (wifi only). Only encrypted traffic goes through the mobile device, e.g. cheap Firefox phone. Decryption takes place on wifi-only "media player" device in the form factor of a phone. This is still exposed to DMA attacks from wifi device, but it's a smaller attack surface. Next level of protection is a hardware IOMMU on Cortex-A15 or x86 VT-d, plus a Type-1 hypervisor to isolate the wifi device.