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That's perfectly fine, but this case is built on testimony from Mark Klein concerning Room 641A, which is right on the coastline (it's in San Francisco). That

That's perfectly fine, but this case is built on testimony from Mark Klein concerning Room 641A, which is right on the coastline (it's in San Francisco). That seems to me to likely be an ideal place to capture international traffic.

AnthonyMouse 12y ago
Well, I would argue the ideal place to capture international traffic would be... internationally. It's pretty hard to capture traffic between Iran and Pakistan from a room in California. But you're just avoiding the issue. The fact that there is an international peering point in San Francisco is no excuse for them to be capturing traffic between San Francisco and Houston or New York.
- csandreasen 12y ago
  Yeah, it'd pretty hard to capture traffic between Iran and Pakistan, but not, say, Russia and Venezuela. The US is a huge hub for traffic transiting the globe, and the risks associated with setting up a foreign collections facility don't apply to a domestic facility. How am I avoiding the issue? I have absolutely no problem with the NSA intercepting foreign traffic - that's their job. The EFF page shows them filtering out domestic traffic in their diagram, and Mark Klein's testimony, on which the EFF is building their Jewel v. NSA case, doesn't actually demonstrate any interception of US traffic.
  - AnthonyMouse 12y ago
    You're avoiding the issue by talking about what Mark Klein revealed and ignoring what Edward Snowden revealed. The NSA is not capturing only traffic between Russia and Venezuela or only traffic that crosses a national border. They are sitting on the links into Google's data centers. Google is a domestic entity. So either they're sitting on a link and then filtering out 100% of the traffic (which is preposterous) or they're sitting on a link where 100% of the traffic goes to and from a domestic entity and not filtering it out.
    - csandreasen 12y ago
      What Mark Klein revealed is the backbone for the case - the plaintiffs in Jewel v. NSA are claiming that they have standing because they are AT&T customers. Here is their argument[1]: "First, the government unconstitutionally seizes plaintiffs’ Internet communications. Technology at plaintiffs’ Internet service provider, AT&T, automatically creates and delivers to the government a copy of plaintiffs’ online activities, along with those of millions of other innocent Americans—including email, live chat, reading and interacting with websites, Internet searching, and social networking. Second, the government unconstitutionally searches the content of much of the communications stream it has seized. The government admits that it searches the content of the online communications that it has seized if it believes there is some indication that the origin or destination of the communication is outside the United States." As I scroll through the statement of facts, I see Mark Klein's testimony, the PCLOB 702 report and Barton Gellman's article from earlier this month cited. Klein's testimony is key to this case because that's how the EFF is establishing that the plaintiffs have standing. > The NSA is not capturing only traffic between Russia and Venezuela or only traffic that crosses a national border. The EFF itself is saying right in their article and court filing[2] that the NSA is discarding purely domestic traffic. > They are sitting on the links into Google's data centers. Google is a domestic entity. So either they're sitting on a link and then filtering out 100% of the traffic (which is preposterous) or they're sitting on a link where 100% of the traffic goes to and from a domestic entity and not filtering it out. There is absolutely no evidence of this. I assume you're making a reference to the Barton Gellman's MUSCULAR reporting[3], which claimed that the NSA was making use of GCHQ's tapping of international fiber to scan Google's unencrypted international communications for their targets. [1] https://www.eff.org/document/plaintiffs-jewel-knutzen-and-waltons-motion-partial-summary-judgment https://www.eff.org/document/plaintiffs-jewel-knutzen-and-wa... (see page 7) [2] Same as above, page 10 [3] http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/11/04/how-we-know-the-nsa-had-access-to-internal-google-and-yahoo-cloud-data/ http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/11/04...

AnthonyMouse 12y ago

Well, I would argue the ideal place to capture international traffic would be... internationally. It's pretty hard to capture traffic between Iran and Pakistan from a room in California. But you're just avoiding the issue. The fact that there is an international peering point in San Francisco is no excuse for them to be capturing traffic between San Francisco and Houston or New York.

csandreasen 12y ago
Yeah, it'd pretty hard to capture traffic between Iran and Pakistan, but not, say, Russia and Venezuela. The US is a huge hub for traffic transiting the globe, and the risks associated with setting up a foreign collections facility don't apply to a domestic facility. How am I avoiding the issue? I have absolutely no problem with the NSA intercepting foreign traffic - that's their job. The EFF page shows them filtering out domestic traffic in their diagram, and Mark Klein's testimony, on which the EFF is building their Jewel v. NSA case, doesn't actually demonstrate any interception of US traffic.
- AnthonyMouse 12y ago
  You're avoiding the issue by talking about what Mark Klein revealed and ignoring what Edward Snowden revealed. The NSA is not capturing only traffic between Russia and Venezuela or only traffic that crosses a national border. They are sitting on the links into Google's data centers. Google is a domestic entity. So either they're sitting on a link and then filtering out 100% of the traffic (which is preposterous) or they're sitting on a link where 100% of the traffic goes to and from a domestic entity and not filtering it out.
  - csandreasen 12y ago
    What Mark Klein revealed is the backbone for the case - the plaintiffs in Jewel v. NSA are claiming that they have standing because they are AT&T customers. Here is their argument[1]: "First, the government unconstitutionally seizes plaintiffs’ Internet communications. Technology at plaintiffs’ Internet service provider, AT&T, automatically creates and delivers to the government a copy of plaintiffs’ online activities, along with those of millions of other innocent Americans—including email, live chat, reading and interacting with websites, Internet searching, and social networking. Second, the government unconstitutionally searches the content of much of the communications stream it has seized. The government admits that it searches the content of the online communications that it has seized if it believes there is some indication that the origin or destination of the communication is outside the United States." As I scroll through the statement of facts, I see Mark Klein's testimony, the PCLOB 702 report and Barton Gellman's article from earlier this month cited. Klein's testimony is key to this case because that's how the EFF is establishing that the plaintiffs have standing. > The NSA is not capturing only traffic between Russia and Venezuela or only traffic that crosses a national border. The EFF itself is saying right in their article and court filing[2] that the NSA is discarding purely domestic traffic. > They are sitting on the links into Google's data centers. Google is a domestic entity. So either they're sitting on a link and then filtering out 100% of the traffic (which is preposterous) or they're sitting on a link where 100% of the traffic goes to and from a domestic entity and not filtering it out. There is absolutely no evidence of this. I assume you're making a reference to the Barton Gellman's MUSCULAR reporting[3], which claimed that the NSA was making use of GCHQ's tapping of international fiber to scan Google's unencrypted international communications for their targets. [1] https://www.eff.org/document/plaintiffs-jewel-knutzen-and-waltons-motion-partial-summary-judgment https://www.eff.org/document/plaintiffs-jewel-knutzen-and-wa... (see page 7) [2] Same as above, page 10 [3] http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/11/04/how-we-know-the-nsa-had-access-to-internal-google-and-yahoo-cloud-data/ http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/11/04...