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I think that it's probably safer to assume that if the attacker controls a local user account, escalating that to root privs "isn't that difficult." I see such
by pyre 12y ago
I think that it's probably safer to assume that if the attacker controls a local user account, escalating that to root privs "isn't that difficult." I see such comments all of the time here by people that should know about security.
Separating concerns be user account has its uses (e.g. sandboxing an app from accidentally screwing with files it doesn't need access to), but I don't think you necessarily want it as the linchpin of your encryption strategy.
- chacham15 12y agoThat is not a fair assumption. The reason being that you know nothing about the type of vulnerability that they are exploiting. For example, if the site has a SQL injection attack, user separation in the database would prove quite useful. > but I don't think you necessarily want it as the linchpin of your encryption strategy. Its not about having one thing at "the linchpin". In fact, you should not rely on any singular thing, but rather separate out pieces of information so that no part has more than it needs. The test user should not have access to the production database and vice versa. In sum, you should use multiple things to defend yourself, not just one.