And I'll lead by example. My underlying moral intuitions as relevant to the specific situation at hand are as follows: - generally speaking I don't expect rea

And I'll lead by example. My underlying moral intuitions as relevant to the specific situation at hand are as follows: - generally speaking I don't expect real-world moral dilemmas to have parties unambiguously in the right and in the wrong. It is convenient when things work out that way but not to be expected; what is to be expected is that a real-world moral dilemma will have convincing arguments on all sides. Consequently making a moral judgment is not playing "spot the villain!" but, instead, deciding which position has the most merit; that a particular position has the most merit says nothing about the merits (or lack thereof) of the other positions other than that what merit the other positions have is less than the position with the most merit. tl;dr: moral dilemmas involve hard choices. - generally speaking mortal peril -- the threat of losing one's life -- is a significant circumstance that effects how I judge someone's actions. For example: I think murder is wrong, but killing in self-defense is not wrong; most justice systems of the world recognize this principle, and I think they do so correctly. - there's nothing magical about contracts that exempts them from the previous point: when one party to a contract can only fulfill that contract at cost of that party's own life, the situation demands heavy scrutiny; expecting someone to place adherence to past agreements above self-preservation fails most common-sense morality tests (and is for example why killing in self-defense is considered differently from murder, and why bank employees aren't usually charged with theft when a bank robber sticks a gun in their face). Just having your life at risk isn't carte-blanche to do anything you want; it's simply a relevant fact that colors how I judge a person's decision to renege on past agreements - in the specific case of an individual suffering from a terminal illness with a single, patented cure who has tried-and-failed in good faith to negotiate a hardship discount from the patent holder I see nothing morally wrong in the individual using their own materials and knowledge to produce the patented substance thereby saving their own life (risking what consequences may come). This analysis is equal parts general moral principles -- not expecting people to go to their own graves for the general benefit of society -- and the specifics of the situation at hand (ignoring patents: fine; stealing stuff: not so fine) - (unsurprisingly) I also think that in the case of third-world nations facing national epidemics that a similar moral conclusion obtains: if after a good-faith effort to negotiate a price the nation can afford (where "afford" means "purchase in enough quantities to halt the epidemic / mass suffering / etc") then the nation cannot be faulted for ignoring the patents and self-manufacturing the substances in question (regardless of whether production is nationalized or farmed out to private-sector actors); I don't expect the patent holders to like this -- and I don't think they're wrong to dislike it -- but I also don't see anything wrong with the state's actions in that case. The morality-of-the-state does not immediately follow from the individual situation but I think that it does follow insofar as you view the state as obligated to advance its citizens' aggregate interests. I can understand why one might believe the state would better advance its citizens' aggregate interests by respecting the patent-holder's rights, and have already explained in great detail why I don't take that position. These are relevant moral intuitions; can you state yours?