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I suspect many onlookers are going to misunderstand the intent of the rules that fill rulebooks like these. I suspect this because of ChuckFrank's comment which

I suspect many onlookers are going to misunderstand the intent of the rules that fill rulebooks like these. I suspect this because of ChuckFrank's comment which identifies problems and proposes solutions, as all we hackertypes instinctively do. The thing is, when they say: > create a 'nomination', 'verification' and 'implementation' process with their “originators,” “nominators,” “aggregators,” “screeners,” and “encountering agencies.” And we all reel in horror at how bad this is procedurally, we must remember that they are not doing this to determine terrorists. They are doing this because if they do put people on lists and need to watch them (for whatever reason), and end up being very wrong, they need to diffuse the damage to organization level (which cannot be held accountable) instead of individuals. In other words, its not about codifying who is a suspected and actual terrorist. It's about internal damage control so that no individual can be blamed when something goes wrong. I'm not sure the US Gov is entirely at fault here, at least not in a actually-tring-to-be-sinister sense. I think that most large businesses end up with these same processes for the exact same reasons. The only difference here is the topic, which is creepy as hell. But I think its working as intended. (Business example: General Motors deadly ignition switch recall[1]. Their processes are set up to shift blame, not to locate discrete problems that trace back to discrete decisions.) This is why Khalid El-Masri (See qeorge's comment) can never face his accuser. He was accused by aggregate. It's processes determination by firing squad. [1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_General_Motors_recall http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_General_Motors_recall

rosser 12y ago
Oh, well that totally makes it okay, then. EDIT, since bare sarcasm is beneath the level of discourse I try to contribute here: To the contrary, having a codified set of rules that are designed to deflect blame away from bad or negligent actors is exactly the wrong solution to this problem. Consider the case of Rahinah Ibrahim; an FBI desk-pusher checked the wrong box on a form and it took her 12 years and millions of dollars worth of lawyer time to get that mistake, something a system like this is designed to entrench, to get that fixed.
ChuckFrank 12y ago
Your point is excellent. It's not that this process is created in error. The process is created to 'diffuse the damage to an organizational level - which cannot be held accountable.' Still I think that aside from gross incompetence or negligence, as a society we understand that people make mistakes such as prosecutorial error, and we have systems in place to deal with them (more or less). And yes, the problem is that here, as with problems in the criminal justice system, it's not only creepy as hell, but it also undermines the optimal functioning of a system. Resources get mis-allocated, contributing members of society get impeded, justice is denied, power differentials are exacerbated, etc. Transparency, equitability, justice those are all essential components to a great society, both in terms of functioning and in terms of ethics - and we should be doing the work to make it happen. Here's another opportunity to do so. Great point though.
AaronFriel 12y ago
This is exactly the sort of problem that often occurs in businesses and organizations, large and small. Startups should take note! This is what you get when you have ambiguous specifications or requirements, and delegate the implementation to a committee. The authors make this point clear: Obama hoped that his response to the “underwear bomber” would be a turning point. In 2010, he gave increased powers and responsibilities to the agencies that nominate individuals to the lists, placing pressure on them to add names. Individuals had perverse incentives to meet the highest possible expectations, incredible pressure to err on the side of the safety of the organization, and the comfort of never having to answer to the public because everything is secret. Am I talking about GitHub's human resources failure in dealing with harassment, or the federal government delegating producing names for a watchlist out to 19 separate organizations? The answer: both. Every organization can fall prey to people internalizing the value of the organization's insiders over everyone else. "Us vs them" attitudes pervade society and our social fabric, and bureaucracy and poor management exacerbate the issue. For the government, that means there are a hundred thousand terrorists living among us; and for your startup, it means you might be inculcating a dangerous culture that can come back to bite you. At least the government doesn't have to worry about its revenue stream drying up from bad publicity.

rosser 12y ago

Oh, well that totally makes it okay, then. EDIT, since bare sarcasm is beneath the level of discourse I try to contribute here: To the contrary, having a codified set of rules that are designed to deflect blame away from bad or negligent actors is exactly the wrong solution to this problem. Consider the case of Rahinah Ibrahim; an FBI desk-pusher checked the wrong box on a form and it took her 12 years and millions of dollars worth of lawyer time to get that mistake, something a system like this is designed to entrench, to get that fixed.

ChuckFrank 12y ago

Your point is excellent. It's not that this process is created in error. The process is created to 'diffuse the damage to an organizational level - which cannot be held accountable.' Still I think that aside from gross incompetence or negligence, as a society we understand that people make mistakes such as prosecutorial error, and we have systems in place to deal with them (more or less). And yes, the problem is that here, as with problems in the criminal justice system, it's not only creepy as hell, but it also undermines the optimal functioning of a system. Resources get mis-allocated, contributing members of society get impeded, justice is denied, power differentials are exacerbated, etc. Transparency, equitability, justice those are all essential components to a great society, both in terms of functioning and in terms of ethics - and we should be doing the work to make it happen. Here's another opportunity to do so. Great point though.

AaronFriel 12y ago

This is exactly the sort of problem that often occurs in businesses and organizations, large and small. Startups should take note! This is what you get when you have ambiguous specifications or requirements, and delegate the implementation to a committee. The authors make this point clear: Obama hoped that his response to the “underwear bomber” would be a turning point. In 2010, he gave increased powers and responsibilities to the agencies that nominate individuals to the lists, placing pressure on them to add names. Individuals had perverse incentives to meet the highest possible expectations, incredible pressure to err on the side of the safety of the organization, and the comfort of never having to answer to the public because everything is secret. Am I talking about GitHub's human resources failure in dealing with harassment, or the federal government delegating producing names for a watchlist out to 19 separate organizations? The answer: both. Every organization can fall prey to people internalizing the value of the organization's insiders over everyone else. "Us vs them" attitudes pervade society and our social fabric, and bureaucracy and poor management exacerbate the issue. For the government, that means there are a hundred thousand terrorists living among us; and for your startup, it means you might be inculcating a dangerous culture that can come back to bite you. At least the government doesn't have to worry about its revenue stream drying up from bad publicity.