4 ms·
> It's good to know Apple has the power to look through your encrypted files given physical access (file relay). So the requisites are: "be Apple" and "have ph
by aktau 12y ago
> It's good to know Apple has the power to look through your encrypted files given physical access (file relay).
So the requisites are: "be Apple" and "have physical access"? That's awfully little for what's supposed to be encrypted files.
It (seems to be) no secret that law enforcement sends devices to Apple when they can't handle them themselves. So if I'm understanding it right: you can't protect yourself with an iDevice, consider all your data compromised?
Sensationalist or not, it bothers me a little.
- jglidden 12y agoAre we concerned about Apple here or just commercial phones in general? To me that's a pretty good security model, if true. I can choose not to give Apple my phone and I can supervise them. I don't know of another commercial phone that protects us better at the moment.
- fredsted 12y agoI think this is relevant; Apple says "diagnostic info" while others say that it's the users' personal encrypted files. I haven't found confirmation on whether the list Zdziarsky has in his presentation is exaggerated, completely true, or false.
- thetinguy 12y agoWhat's the difference? Are personal files never ever diagnostically relevant?
- josho 12y agoWhat is the threat model that concerns you? If you don't trust Apple then don't use iOS full stop. I trust Apple engineers, but not Apple Store employees. So, for me the question to ask is what effort is required to circumvent the system. If any employee at an Apple Store can circumvent your encryption then that is an issue. If circumventing requires your passcode, then that's far less concerning.
- Karunamon 12y agoUse your imagination. Apple could be compelled to dump a device you're sending in for repairs, for example. A great deal of these (backdoors/vulnerabilities/developer tools) have no reason to exist in a non-developer-mode consumer device.