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I didn't see anything in the TXT whitepaper about securing programs run by a hypervisor against attacks by the hypervisor. Seems more focused on making sure tha
by al2o3cr 12y ago
I didn't see anything in the TXT whitepaper about securing programs run by a hypervisor against attacks by the hypervisor. Seems more focused on making sure that managed VMs can't compromise their neighbors or do side-channely things.
If I provide your VM with a simulated "TPM" that actually emails me the private keys, how is that supposed to be secure?
- liam8841 12y agoIf I understand rightly, this sort of security is impossible until fully homomorphic encryption is invented. Any actual cryptos available to comment?
- mike_hearn 12y agoThe TPM is un-simulatable, that's the purpose of it. The hypervisor is included in the remote attestation. The theory is, if you trust the signing keys used in the TPM (i.e. Intel/the hardware), then you can get a message from the remote computer that attests what code is running including the hypervisor. Thus you can conclude that the remote environment is safe against all but quite sophisticated hardware attackers (assuming a modern setup where you can lock cache lines and the TPM is integrated with the northbridge).