3 ms·

There is the threshold at which each measurement is giving you less information than brute-force. At that point, you can say "this is not vulnerable to a timing

There is the threshold at which each measurement is giving you less information than brute-force. At that point, you can say "this is not vulnerable to a timing attack" even if a timing side-channel is present. The larger the search space, the more noise you would be willing to put up with.... EDIT: I'm not sure what you mean by N. If you mean N as the size of the search space rather than N as the number of requests, I agree with you!

murbard2 12y ago
You actually do both. Each measurement induces a probability distribution over the space upon which you bruteforce. Also not that timing attacks are quadratic in the noise to signal ratio and linear in key length which bruteforce is exponential in keylengths. So that threshold is likely many orders of magnitude smaller than you imagine.