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> It's complicated to deploy and misconfigurations cause outages, and those outages get more severe the more people deploy DNSSEC. It needs to be maintained of
by xorcist 12y ago
> It's complicated to deploy and misconfigurations cause outages, and those outages get more severe the more people deploy DNSSEC.
It needs to be maintained of course, just like any deployment, but is it worse in this regard to other protocols? I would say no. If you can get a TLS certificate for your web server, you can get your DNS records signed.
The whole infrastructure is in place. Your operations team should know this already. There are books, courses, certifications. The whole shebang
> DNSCurve, as a counterexample, does solve this problem, and it solves it regardless of whether 1 person deploys it or 300 million do. But all the oxygen has been stolen by DNSSEC.
DNSCurve solves none of the problems that DNSSEC solves.
That's the problem with DNSCurve adoption. Not some conspiracy by the DNSSEC cabal.
> It provides a setting for us to transition the CA system from untrustworthy companies directly to world governments, with the most commercially important domain names giving CA-like authority to (wait for it) the US government.
This is just false. DANE shifts the authority from some 300 individal organisations, private and otherwise, into your parent zone, which you must trust anyway under every sane DNS model.
The authority for the system as a whole is delegated to a transparent organization, currently indirectly appointed by the US government. If the word "government" here makes you see red, you're missing out on the bigger picture.
> it essentially re-enables public zone transfers
This is a true problem with DNSSEC. But it has been discussed over and over again for 15 years and no one really thinks it is a showstopper. It's well covered in the literature.
> a more significant one to me is that I believe it's cryptographically obsolete
Well, show that then. There is a whole working group who'd love to hear something more concrete. That's the way standards should be set, not by personal beliefs.
- tptacek 12y ago"Operations teams should know by now how to handle DNSSEC" isn't a rebuttal to "DNSSEC is complex". DNSCurve converges to the same protection DNSSEC provides; the difference is that during the decade or two in which DNS security isn't fully deployed, DNSCurve actually does something useful, and DNSSEC doesn't. Don't get hung up on the tactical value of DNSCurve just because DNSSEC has no such value. It's a long-term win too. "The CA system is worse" isn't a rebuttal to "DNSSEC/DANE gives the USG direct control of certificates".
- danyork 12y ago> "The CA system is worse" isn't a rebuttal to "DNSSEC/DANE gives the USG direct control of certificates". Again, please stop the overly broad statements and explain precisely HOW "DNSSEC/DANE gives the USG direct control of certificates". I've not yet been able to have someone explain to me how this is true. I put my cert (or a fingerprint) in a TLSA record signed by my DNSSEC key in my DNS zone. Where does the USG get involved?
- tptacek 12y agoThe DNS hierarchy secures all the data in your zone.
- danyork 12y agoMaybe it's just that I'm deliriously tired, but I'm still missing how "the DNS root" can alter the data in MY zone sitting on my little authoritative server somewhere. Can you please walk me through the actual attack? As someone else pointed out, all the root can do is potentially redirect a TLD to a controlled TLD registry, which could then conceivably serve out NS records for my domain pointing to an owned authoritative DNS server... which could then serve out bogus data. BUT... I have to think someone would notice the redirected TLD!
- tptacek 12y agoWhy? Why do you think someone would notice that? The attacker is going to do everything they can to prevent you from noticing.
- xorcist 12y ago> "Operations teams should know by now how to handle DNSSEC" isn't a rebuttal to "DNSSEC is complex". It's not meant to be. "Is it worse than comparable protocols? I would say no." is the argument. This is all a matter of personal opinions of course, but it's not more complicated than the TLS/CA system. The operating procedures is modelled against regular DNS, on purpose, and should fit well into your existing workflow. But this all besides the point since the standard works and is in place all around the world. > DNSCurve converges to the same protection DNSSEC provides Please don't. This discussion has been had a million times on IETF mailing lists and I don't know why it keeps popping up. Perhaps djb has some sort of fan base out there who wants him to "win" some imaginary discussion. No, DNSCurve is designed to secure your DNS questions and answers from prying eyes. DNSSEC is designed to authenticate and proof the extisting DNS system from tampering both by resolving and authoritative servers. One of the early design goals of DNSSEC was to be backwards compatible with the existing DNS system, protocols and implementations. Any divergence from these principles will be very difficult to get implemented. Any reason why DNSCurve or any other standard in the DNS space is without implementations should be sought here, not in a conspiracy. > DNSCurve actually does something useful, and DNSSEC doesn't. That's simply not true. DNSSEC is implemented around the world and solves a problem. If it is a useful problem or not depends on your point of view. But there is no reason to come up with all these straw man arguments against a technical standard. Please join the relevant mailing lists and speak your mind in more technical terms instead. There is no cabal in your way, but you must be prepared to argue design goals, operating procedures, implementation, and Internet governance. > "The CA system is worse" isn't a rebuttal to "DNSSEC/DANE gives the USG direct control of certificates" That's not what I said. No, DANE does not in any way give the US Government direct control over certificates. It does, however, make them dependent on the DNS root, which is administered by an organization indirectly appointed by the US Government. However, that is not a problem given that the US Government has not much actual say over daily operations -- and even if they did, that would not be a practical attack vector due to the reasons laid out above. "The CA system is worse" is a rebuttal to not doing anything. If you want the CA model gone, you need to get your TLSA records out there and you need to get them signed, now. The reason for that is that there is no alternative. DNSCurve does not solve this problem. TACK does not solve this problem. No other system has support in any popular DNS software, and designing any contender takes ten years to get implementation, support and operations right. Please keep attacking this problem, and please keep testing new ways to solve this. Not by rehashing old arguments against DNSSEC that has already been rebutted, but by embracing it and see what can be done better.