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Greeaaaat. Just what everyone needs. An extra expense and further entrenchment of our exploitative CA system. I like this idea, but not when it puts more money
by Karunamon 12y ago
Greeaaaat. Just what everyone needs. An extra expense and further entrenchment of our exploitative CA system.
I like this idea, but not when it puts more money in the pocket of the CAs.
- scrollaway 12y agoIf a better/broader alternative to CAs comes along and is adopted (say, such as SPDY), I take it the icon would behave the same way. Your comment is really unwarranted... Not to mention this is just some random guy. It's not like mozilla is actually thinking about this (they really should).
- M2Ys4U 12y agoSPDY is completely orthogonal to the CA issue.
- Karunamon 12y ago>Your comment is really unwarranted... Not really - changes like this don't exist in a vacuum. Anything that makes the existing CA's more indispensable (say, by driving customers their way by making it appear bad to not do business with them) is a net negative.
- AlyssaRowan 12y agoI refer you to RFC6698, DANE TLSA: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6698 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6698 In actual use, it works like this: • You implement DNSSEC (easier when it's done automatically; going forward, my proposal is that every DNS registrar must support DS records in order to renew their registrar licence - adapt or die: I'm looking especially at you, Namecheap) • You publish a TLSA record • This contains a hash of a certificate's public key (other options are available, like hashing the whole certificate, or even including the whole certificate, but this is the most sensible one) and a pinning mode, one of: - 0: CA Constraint - Certificate must be trusted by browser, AND this particular CA must sign it - 1: Service Certificate Constraint - Certificate must be trusted by browser, AND it must be this particular certificate - 2: Trust Anchor Assertion: This particular CA must sign the certificate - 3: Domain-Issued Certificate: It must be this particular certificate Basically, this is a way to 'pin' certificates to DNSSEC, either additionally (0,1) or instead of (2,3) the PKIX CA system. Already implemented in Chrome as a test but taken out because no-one used it - it can come back. If clients implement it, we can replace/augment the CA system as necessary. You're welcome.
- TheLoneWolfling 12y agoSo... You're suggesting to do something that was at one point implemented in one of the major browsers, but isn't even implemented in that one currently. What happens on the other browsers? Scary warning?