3 ms·
> Don't block; seriously, don't block. Just spit out the output of a properly-seeded PRF (e.g. AES in CTR mode). /dev/urandom does that and it is the suggested
by gioele 12y ago
> Don't block; seriously, don't block. Just spit out the output of a properly-seeded PRF (e.g. AES in CTR mode).
/dev/urandom does that and it is the suggested way to get secure random numbers for 99% of the applications.
- wtbob 12y agoNo, /dev/urandom fails the 'properly-seeded' criterion during early boot. The real answer is to just change the interface and be done with it, and to hell with backwards-compatibility, but that'll never happen. The really real answer is to make /dev/random and /dev/urandom the same CSPRNG, seeded as early in boot as possible (and continually refreshed with more entropy, of course), and never blocking thereafter, but that'll never happen either.