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His ideas about subverting the security community are interesting. But I think his emphasis on knowing the source of everything is weird. In my opinion the mai
by im3w1l 12y ago
His ideas about subverting the security community are interesting.
But I think his emphasis on knowing the source of everything is weird. In my opinion the main security responsibility of the kernel is to not let users escalate, preventing users from writing and modifying where they shouldn't, and reading what they shouldn't.
Followed by preventing denial of service by enforcing quotas.
His idea about tagging source for processes based on what files they read, and then tagging written files with those sources sounds like a bad one. I think many processes would read files from a lot of unrelated users, which would lead to noise. Tags seem to pile up, as there is no principle for how to remove tags. Tags are contagious, for when a commonly opened file (say a conf file) is written by an editor, it acquires tags of all files opened by the editor. When the editor creates an output file, all the conf-file tags are transferred over.
When everything has source *, people would just stop caring.
- luke-stanley 12y agoSo long as what tagged it is in there too, there should be enough power to make useful decisions easily.
- pflanze 12y agoHe probably assumes that processes are usually short-lived or limited in their scope (that's the design principles he used in his software, anyway). That way "source creep" doesn't happen so quickly. It reminds me of the taint principle (-T) as provided by Perl 5. The differences are that there the set of sources consists just of "secure" and "insecure", and processes themselves are not tainted. In a world of C programs, tainting processes themselves (as they become in contact with a potential "contagion") may actually make sense.