4 ms·
But the PSTN is the easy part to wiretap. Especially the TDM part of it. Data is nicely partitioned in channels and there is only one single metadata format to
by xorcist 12y ago
But the PSTN is the easy part to wiretap. Especially the TDM part of it. Data is nicely partitioned in channels and there is only one single metadata format to worry about.
And you can not compare the NSA with the police. The latter needs a warrant (sort of, depending on locale) but the former doesn't.
- cowbell 12y agoAccording to everything I've read on the subject, including today's revelation that NSA is recording 80% of all phone calls, is that NSA grabs from the backbone. They do not have monitoring installed at endpoints. That would be expensive, and in foreign countries, infeasible. It's hardly perfect, but I think everyone can agree it's better than unencrypted all the way. Everyone except the Friends of NSA trying to convince everyone to stay away, because "it isn't truly secure"... You've got to start somewhere.
- xorcist 12y agoThat's what I'm saying. The "backbone", by which I take it you mean the big PSTN providers, is by far the easiest point to wiretap. Internet exchange points are by design far more heterogenous, plus that wirespeed protocol parsers that has the ability to parse the plurality of protocols used is at least an order of magnitude more difficult/expensive. The five eyes do that as well, no doubt about it. But if you encrypt your traffic on IP and then switch out to unencrypted PSTN then that's completely useless as you'd risk drawing unnecessary attention to your plaintext.
- cowbell 12y ago>But if you encrypt your traffic on IP and then switch out to unencrypted PSTN then that's completely useless as you'd risk drawing unnecessary attention to your plaintext. So the solution you suggest is to try to hide in plain sight? Good luck with that.
- xorcist 12y agoWhy would you think that? Am I really that unclear? If I had to venture a suggestion it would be to encrypt your data end-to-end.
- cowbell 12y agolol. Right, because my mom's rotary phone will work like that. That's the "comprehensive reform" argument weaselly politicians use. Ex. Chuck Schumer works for the banking industry. The banking industry needs reform after financial crisis. Chuck blocks banking reform by demanding "comprehensive reform" and refuses to implement partial measures that would help/start the reform process. He claims he's strongly in favor of reform. So much he's unwilling to compromise for partial measures. As such, he votes against all measures of reform. Sure Chuck, we all believe you really want to reform the banks that paid for your elections. If end to PSTN can make it more expensive for the NSA to collect, then it's good, even if it isn't foolproof. If the default config for apache were to generate self signed certificates, you would say, that's useless, because MITM. I would say, that's great, because now NSA is forced to MITM if they want to snoop. It increases the expense for the attacker, making their ability to snoop more limited.
- xorcist 12y ago> Right, because my mom's rotary phone will work like that. No it doesn't. That's why you shouldn't market products with the claim to make secure calls to her. There are product to encrypt PSTN calls. These products needs to be used at both ends to be effective. > If end to PSTN can make it more expensive for the NSA to collect, then it's good, It doesn't, that's the point. You can count on the whole SS7 being compromised, all the time. It's where these agencies came from. > If the default config for apache were to generate self signed certificates, you would say, that's useless, because MITM. Again words in my mouth. I believe it is in fact the default in the major distributions, and it isn't "useless". This has absolutely nothing to do with the PSTN so I won't discuss this particular straw man further.
- 12y ago