5 ms·
The signaling server, while unable to decrypt communications, has the inherent ability to record "metadata" about each connection, with to ability to create a p
by ecto 12y ago
The signaling server, while unable to decrypt communications, has the inherent ability to record "metadata" about each connection, with to ability to create a peer association graph. Not a deal breaker, but worth mentioning. WebRTC is awesome.
More considerations at https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5766#page-55 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5766#page-55
- cjbprime 12y agoThat's true. If this is an issue you could avoid using a signaling server altogether, and instead exchange offer/answer via e.g. GPG-encrypted email. I wonder if there are any designs for a signaling server/system that doesn't have this loss of privacy of connection information, or if you just very quickly end up reimplementing Tor when you try..
- obvio171 12y agoGood point. If any sufficiently complicated NAT traversal solution ends up containing an ad hoc, informally-specified, bug-ridden, slow implementation of half of the hidden services protocol, might as well put our efforts into building out Tor itself and get the privacy for "free".