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RFC6394 and RFC6698 are the useful bits here. The problem is they don't really offer much except a minimization of the attack footprint; instead of attacking on
by peterwwillis 12y ago
RFC6394 and RFC6698 are the useful bits here. The problem is they don't really offer much except a minimization of the attack footprint; instead of attacking one of 650 CAs you're attacking the dns root servers, which aren't impenetrable. The protocol itself has numerous flaws and basically nobody is implementing DNSSEC.
If you combined it with a CA system it would potentially increase security for a given domain and DNSSEC users, and add onto that a Convergence-style decentralized system and you get another layer. Of course, that is a hell of a lot of extra complication just to prevent a state actor from easily circumventing your HTTPS connection, so I doubt anyone will go for it.
- xorcist 12y agoThat is not fair criticism. The DNS root servers do not hold the keys to the root zone and have no ability to sign records. Neither do their operators. Please also do look up the list of successful attacks on the root zone infrastructure. It is a very, very short list. Not imprenetrable of course; nothing is. But it does not need to be. The fact that authoritative servers can not sign records is central to the design.