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This event also highlights, again, that our Certificate Transparency project is critical for protecting the security of certificates in the future. No! Certifi

This event also highlights, again, that our Certificate Transparency project is critical for protecting the security of certificates in the future. No! Certificate Transparency still relays on central authorities. We need to get rid of CAs. TACK + Convergence is the correct solution.

cordite 12y ago
I've never heard of TACK before. Are these what you are referring to? [1] [2] [1]: http://tack.io/ http://tack.io/ [2]: http://convergence.io/ http://convergence.io/
- y0ghur7_xxx 12y ago
  Yes
contingencies 12y ago
I agree decentralization is desirable but haven't studied all of the proposals in depth. Over at http://www.certificate-transparency.org/comparison http://www.certificate-transparency.org/comparison Google claims: ...that their CT approach is superior to TACK because (T1) Servers can instantly roll out a new key if the previous one is lost (T2) Global (ie. whole internet sees evil server instead of good server) and targeted attack detection is superior (T3) There are no trusted third parties (T4) Newly issued keys on totally new sites can also be validated (to a greater extent) (T5) No server modification (ie. to deliver pinning headers) is required. ... that their CT approach is superior to Convergence because (C1) It is not known to introduce side-channel attacks due to changes in the SSL connection negotiation phase (C2) Servers can instantly roll out a new key if the previous one is lost (C3) Global attacks (ie. whole internet sees evil server instead of good server) are negated (C4) There are no trusted third parties (C5) Newly issued keys on totally new sites can also be validated (C6) No server modification (ie. to deliver pinning headers) is required. Can anyone refute these claims?
- y0ghur7_xxx 12y ago
  Alexandra C. Grant wrote a paper comparing different methods of improving the current CA system: http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/reports/TR2012-716.pdf http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/reports/TR2012-716.pdf But unfortunately she does not take TACK/pinning + Convergence in consideration.
  - mike_hearn 12y ago
    I wrote an article discussing many CA alternatives which also includes Convergence, here: https://medium.com/bitcoin-security-functionality/b64cf5912aa7 https://medium.com/bitcoin-security-functionality/b64cf5912a... Convergence IMHO does not work. The UI is poor and fundamentally it's just the CA model with very short lived constantly renewed certificates. There's no particular reason to believe it'd work better than the existing PKI for ordinary users.
    - exo762 12y ago
      > it's just the CA model with very short lived constantly renewed certificates Very strange conclusion. Convergence have following properties CA model does not have: * trust is optional (you don't have to trust Iranian CAs) * trust is revocable (you can safely remove trust from any notary) * trust is distributed (you trust only if all notaries are acting as one; as opposing to "you trust anything any of CAs will say") Notaries are not signing anything, they are not CAs. Also, there is nothing like "short lived constantly renewed certificates" in this model. Hosts are using self-signed certs (or CA signed - does not matter). Notaries are functioning in "attacker will not MiTM whole Internet" model and only help you detecting if something went wrong. If anything, convergence is a combination of TOFU and WoT models. Although an attempt to describe a security model by such comparisons does not help much.
    - y0ghur7_xxx 12y ago
      > Convergence IMHO does not work. The UI is poor There is no need for a UI in Convergence that I know of? What part are you talking about? > and fundamentally it's just the CA model with very short lived constantly renewed certificates. I don't understand what you are referring to. There are no "short lived constantly renewed certificates" in Convergence. Maybe you mean something else

cordite 12y ago

I've never heard of TACK before. Are these what you are referring to? [1] [2] [1]: http://tack.io/ http://tack.io/ [2]: http://convergence.io/ http://convergence.io/

y0ghur7_xxx 12y ago
Yes

contingencies 12y ago

I agree decentralization is desirable but haven't studied all of the proposals in depth. Over at http://www.certificate-transparency.org/comparison http://www.certificate-transparency.org/comparison Google claims: ...that their CT approach is superior to TACK because (T1) Servers can instantly roll out a new key if the previous one is lost (T2) Global (ie. whole internet sees evil server instead of good server) and targeted attack detection is superior (T3) There are no trusted third parties (T4) Newly issued keys on totally new sites can also be validated (to a greater extent) (T5) No server modification (ie. to deliver pinning headers) is required. ... that their CT approach is superior to Convergence because (C1) It is not known to introduce side-channel attacks due to changes in the SSL connection negotiation phase (C2) Servers can instantly roll out a new key if the previous one is lost (C3) Global attacks (ie. whole internet sees evil server instead of good server) are negated (C4) There are no trusted third parties (C5) Newly issued keys on totally new sites can also be validated (C6) No server modification (ie. to deliver pinning headers) is required. Can anyone refute these claims?

y0ghur7_xxx 12y ago
Alexandra C. Grant wrote a paper comparing different methods of improving the current CA system: http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/reports/TR2012-716.pdf http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/reports/TR2012-716.pdf But unfortunately she does not take TACK/pinning + Convergence in consideration.
- mike_hearn 12y ago
  I wrote an article discussing many CA alternatives which also includes Convergence, here: https://medium.com/bitcoin-security-functionality/b64cf5912aa7 https://medium.com/bitcoin-security-functionality/b64cf5912a... Convergence IMHO does not work. The UI is poor and fundamentally it's just the CA model with very short lived constantly renewed certificates. There's no particular reason to believe it'd work better than the existing PKI for ordinary users.
  - exo762 12y ago
    > it's just the CA model with very short lived constantly renewed certificates Very strange conclusion. Convergence have following properties CA model does not have: * trust is optional (you don't have to trust Iranian CAs) * trust is revocable (you can safely remove trust from any notary) * trust is distributed (you trust only if all notaries are acting as one; as opposing to "you trust anything any of CAs will say") Notaries are not signing anything, they are not CAs. Also, there is nothing like "short lived constantly renewed certificates" in this model. Hosts are using self-signed certs (or CA signed - does not matter). Notaries are functioning in "attacker will not MiTM whole Internet" model and only help you detecting if something went wrong. If anything, convergence is a combination of TOFU and WoT models. Although an attempt to describe a security model by such comparisons does not help much.
  - y0ghur7_xxx 12y ago
    > Convergence IMHO does not work. The UI is poor There is no need for a UI in Convergence that I know of? What part are you talking about? > and fundamentally it's just the CA model with very short lived constantly renewed certificates. I don't understand what you are referring to. There are no "short lived constantly renewed certificates" in Convergence. Maybe you mean something else