Thank you, that was very informative. I have read about Bayesian inference in epistemology before, but I need to study it in more detail. But that doesn't answ

Thank you, that was very informative. I have read about Bayesian inference in epistemology before, but I need to study it in more detail. But that doesn't answer my original question. The problem here being referred to was people disproving the null hypothesis to indirectly validate the alternative hypothesis, right? Is that still Popperianism? Because as far as I understand it, Popper only tells to keep trying to disprove the actual hypothesis/hypotheses. Take the case of string theory, it may not ever be possible to have direct validation of string theory, and it still turns out to be mathematically useful. As long as there is no evidence that string theory is wrong, Popper tells that people can still use it where it is mathematically useful. According to you, I am guessing mathematically useful theories will have a higher prior. Both these are in opposition to logical positivism, where people hold that string theory isn't meaningful because it isn't validated. Of course, I accept your statement that Popperianism isn't the correct solution to the philosophical problem of how to guide scientists towards the truth. As far as I understand it, its just a way of saying that things can still be meaningful if it hasn't been validated yet. But people misusing p-value testing as a way of confirming the actual hypothesis without testing the actual hypothesis is just misusing Popper's idea as an indirect way to have some validation for their actual hypothesis, and that seemed(seems?) to be closer to logical positivism to me because of how they feel compelled to have some validation to say that their statement is meaningful.