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I learned Bayesianism in a discrete probability and combinatorics class in undergrad, then took frequentist statistics in grad-school. The big problem is not t
by eli_gottlieb 12y ago
I learned Bayesianism in a discrete probability and combinatorics class in undergrad, then took frequentist statistics in grad-school. The big problem is not that frequentism is somehow "just wrong", but that many people combine frequentist hypothesis testing with Popperian falsificationism (see rant above) to shoehorn frequentism into doing inference about hypotheses, which is profoundly wrong and not at all what frequentism is about, mathematically. The explanations for how frequentist inferences get used to do science feel wrong because they are: scientific induction is Bayesian. Of course, given mountains of data, either approach will work and converge to more-or-less identical results, but that's true of almost anything in statistics.
Another thing is that I really wish the frequentist lectures would just up and admit that yes, likelihoods really are conditional probabilities: they're just conditional probabilities in the Bayesian mode. A likelihood (as used in frequentist statistics) is just the probability of the evidence conditioned on a certain parameter value. Even frequentists ought to admit that it talks about a counterfactual limit of the frequency ratio, but apparently calculations on counterfactuals are "too Bayesian" for them, so they pretend that "likelihoods aren't really probabilities". That confused the hell out of me in class.