4 ms·

If we are to accept that some who seek privacy and security are good and innocent, we also need to accept that some who seek those same things can also be bad.

bilalq 12y ago
You can literally replace "seek privacy and security" with almost anything in that statement. I mean, out of all the people that prefer Coke over Pepsi, there are definitely some bad guys. While your statement is true, it doesn't really give any justification on targeted spying. That is, unless of course, we consider the desire to hide things to be a signal of being a bad actor. Thinking along those lines is a very slippery slope though. The erosion of freedoms is just another side-effect of policies and actions shaped by such thinking.
- throwaway5752 12y ago
  That's nonsense. If a credible actor poses a threat, they will attempt to do a competent job hiding their communications and data. Those that don't are by definition less competent and less likely to pose a threat. Pardon the bluntless, but it seems like an a priori conclusion that only people taking pains to hide their data/communications should be targeted. That is not because the vast majority of those people are innocent (they are) but because that is the only group that contains a subset that poses a real & present threat. So, that ignores your slippery slope argument about personal liberties, which are totally valid. How do you balance national security and personal liberty in this case? That's the million dollar question. Please let me know if you question my reasoning. I'm purely looking at it as a 2x2 matrix of (highly encrypts personal data, does not ...) x (seeks to harm people/nation interests, does not ...) So only the people hiding their tracks that seek to harm are the ones to worry about. Those that don't hide their tracks are a lot less likely to be operationally successful</euphemism>. However, I assume that the 99.95% of people that highly encrypt personal do not seek to harm anyone, and are collateral damage here. Constitutional tradeoffs happen all over. Fire in a crowded theater, felons rights to vote, personal rights to own certain weapons, etc. This is another one that needs to be decided very carefully. But I think both sides have very valid concerns.
  - opendais 12y ago
    > How do you balance national security and personal liberty in this case? That's the million dollar question. That would be valid if they could point to any noteworthy success. The fact they can't ["because national security"] pretty much guarantees the program contributes very little real value. If they had anything to do with something important, say Osama's death, you think they wouldn't trumpet it out as "proof" it works? I'd say their lack of evidence that it functions is more damning than anything. They can't exactly hide they are doing it post-Snowden. Their one chance to justify funding for new programs that aren't compromised is to say "LOOK HOW SUCCESSFUL WE ARE!!!!" in broad terms. The fact they cannot do this, and thereby justify larger budgets to Congress, convinces me they know the benefits are negligible.
    - throwaway5752 12y ago
      Do you feel there might be information that they can't publicize? I skeptical and sympathetic to that at the same time. I really would say that it's a question of risk aversion & utitility. Even targetting a whole class of people the odds are probably astronomical of finding someone planning harm (1M:1? more than that?). To me it comes down to the negative utility of privacy invasion * the number of people targeted ??? the probability of detecting & thwarting the one malactor, where ??? is an inequality. Maybe it's good we have risk averse and non risk averse groups, that the balance of power between those groups can change over time as necessary.
      - opendais 12y ago
        > Do you feel there might be information that they can't publicize? I skeptical and sympathetic to that at the same time. XKeyscore is a (at a minimum) 6 years old. You are telling me in 6 years they can't provide the broad strokes of a reasonable number of success stories? The fact they can't stand up and say "Terrorist plot X was stopped by XKeyscore" from 4-5 years ago pretty much proves its a failure as far as I am concerned. > I really would say that it's a question of risk aversion & utitility. Even targetting a whole class of people the odds are probably astronomical of finding someone planning harm (1M:1? more than that?). To me it comes down to the negative utility of privacy invasion * the number of people targeted ??? the probability of detecting & thwarting the one malactor, where ??? is an inequality. Given that with sufficient information a person is able to force another person to do quite a few things via blackmail, its simply too dangerous to trust human beings with this tool. Especially an organization like the NSA where their only knowledge of Snowden's actions came after he released all of the information publicly.

bilalq 12y ago

You can literally replace "seek privacy and security" with almost anything in that statement. I mean, out of all the people that prefer Coke over Pepsi, there are definitely some bad guys. While your statement is true, it doesn't really give any justification on targeted spying. That is, unless of course, we consider the desire to hide things to be a signal of being a bad actor. Thinking along those lines is a very slippery slope though. The erosion of freedoms is just another side-effect of policies and actions shaped by such thinking.

throwaway5752 12y ago
That's nonsense. If a credible actor poses a threat, they will attempt to do a competent job hiding their communications and data. Those that don't are by definition less competent and less likely to pose a threat. Pardon the bluntless, but it seems like an a priori conclusion that only people taking pains to hide their data/communications should be targeted. That is not because the vast majority of those people are innocent (they are) but because that is the only group that contains a subset that poses a real & present threat. So, that ignores your slippery slope argument about personal liberties, which are totally valid. How do you balance national security and personal liberty in this case? That's the million dollar question. Please let me know if you question my reasoning. I'm purely looking at it as a 2x2 matrix of (highly encrypts personal data, does not ...) x (seeks to harm people/nation interests, does not ...) So only the people hiding their tracks that seek to harm are the ones to worry about. Those that don't hide their tracks are a lot less likely to be operationally successful</euphemism>. However, I assume that the 99.95% of people that highly encrypt personal do not seek to harm anyone, and are collateral damage here. Constitutional tradeoffs happen all over. Fire in a crowded theater, felons rights to vote, personal rights to own certain weapons, etc. This is another one that needs to be decided very carefully. But I think both sides have very valid concerns.
- opendais 12y ago
  > How do you balance national security and personal liberty in this case? That's the million dollar question. That would be valid if they could point to any noteworthy success. The fact they can't ["because national security"] pretty much guarantees the program contributes very little real value. If they had anything to do with something important, say Osama's death, you think they wouldn't trumpet it out as "proof" it works? I'd say their lack of evidence that it functions is more damning than anything. They can't exactly hide they are doing it post-Snowden. Their one chance to justify funding for new programs that aren't compromised is to say "LOOK HOW SUCCESSFUL WE ARE!!!!" in broad terms. The fact they cannot do this, and thereby justify larger budgets to Congress, convinces me they know the benefits are negligible.
  - throwaway5752 12y ago
    Do you feel there might be information that they can't publicize? I skeptical and sympathetic to that at the same time. I really would say that it's a question of risk aversion & utitility. Even targetting a whole class of people the odds are probably astronomical of finding someone planning harm (1M:1? more than that?). To me it comes down to the negative utility of privacy invasion * the number of people targeted ??? the probability of detecting & thwarting the one malactor, where ??? is an inequality. Maybe it's good we have risk averse and non risk averse groups, that the balance of power between those groups can change over time as necessary.
    - opendais 12y ago
      > Do you feel there might be information that they can't publicize? I skeptical and sympathetic to that at the same time. XKeyscore is a (at a minimum) 6 years old. You are telling me in 6 years they can't provide the broad strokes of a reasonable number of success stories? The fact they can't stand up and say "Terrorist plot X was stopped by XKeyscore" from 4-5 years ago pretty much proves its a failure as far as I am concerned. > I really would say that it's a question of risk aversion & utitility. Even targetting a whole class of people the odds are probably astronomical of finding someone planning harm (1M:1? more than that?). To me it comes down to the negative utility of privacy invasion * the number of people targeted ??? the probability of detecting & thwarting the one malactor, where ??? is an inequality. Given that with sufficient information a person is able to force another person to do quite a few things via blackmail, its simply too dangerous to trust human beings with this tool. Especially an organization like the NSA where their only knowledge of Snowden's actions came after he released all of the information publicly.