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You can define any consistent logic system you want. It would help if you think of "T" and "F" merely as two symbols rather than having semantics that seem fami
by pron 12y ago
You can define any consistent logic system you want. It would help if you think of "T" and "F" merely as two symbols rather than having semantics that seem familiar to you in the real world. But once you assign the meanings "true" and "false" to those symbols, you venture beyond mathematics into the realm of philosophy (in particular, epistemology). The problem is that while you can define "true" and "false" in a common logic system, taking the same definitions into the real world isn't so smooth. The main problem is that in the real world you don't have axioms -- you have assumptions which might be "true" or "false" (whatever that means once we go beyond our measurement range). This alone pretty much precludes almost everything in the real world from being "true" in the mathematical sense. These assumptions are so pervasive that even the most basic quality, or concept, underlying all of science -- namely, causality -- is a mere assumption. Therefore, your statement "All statements are true, false, arbitrary, or nonsensical" can only be defined to hold in a system of logic, but doesn't necessarily translate into the real world. Mathematically speaking, nothing we know of the physical universe is known to be either true or false. In fact, you can't even conclusively (again, in the mathematical sense) say that two statements about the physical universe contradict, because we don't "know" anything about the physical universe in the same sense as we know something in a mathematical logic system. In short, your opinion is neither true about mathematics (where you can define any system you want) nor about the physical universe, where you can't directly apply any mathematical logic system, and in particular the one you think is "the one true logic".
- atlantic 12y agoExcellent comment. Thanks.
- javert 12y agoThis is pure skepticism. Your position is: "We don't know anything about the real world." That is absolute hokum. The Earth orbits the Sun, living things need fuel to survive, two units combined with two units sums to four units. I could go on and on. You need good epistemology to explain why this is, since while it's common sense, I agree that common sense is not sufficient when we're talking about philosophy. Clearly you have not discovered good epistemology.
- gshubert17 12y agoIsn't his position that mathematical (2+2=4) and logical (!T=F) knowledge is a different kind of knowledge than empirical (temp=20C) or scientific (F=ma)? I took this to be similar to what Einstein [1] said: "As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain; and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality." [1] http://www-groups.dcs.st-and.ac.uk/history/Extras/Einstein_geometry.html http://www-groups.dcs.st-and.ac.uk/history/Extras/Einstein_g...
- pron 12y agoThanks for the Einstein reference. I wasn't familiar with it. However, my comment expressed little more than well established principles in epistemology and the philosophy of science. Einstein in his essay discusses the same general issue. My favorite demonstration of the difficulty of defining (non-mathematical) knowledge is the Gettier problem. The coolest thing about it is that if we try to come up with a definition of knowledge that is always agreed upon by everybody -- one that fully reconciles what we can intuitively and "logically" consider to be knowledge with all forms of the Gettier problem[1] -- we find ourselves with such a narrow definition that hardly covers anything we consider to be "known". This means that in science, as with everything else, we must adopt more lenient -- or pragmatic -- definitions of knowledge, but those definitions are not rigorous in any mathematical sense, and are always lacking. [1]: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem Also, see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_science http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_science http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epistemology http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epistemology
- javert 12y agoYes, that is his position, but it's a false dichotomy.
- pron 12y ago> Your position is: "We don't know anything about the real world." This is absolutely not my "position". The word know requires definition, which is a very hard thing to do, and is the subject of the whole of epistemology. All I'm saying is that "know" in the real world and "know" in logic are not -- and can never be -- the same. We cannot "know" something about the physical universe in the same sense that we "know" something to be true in mathematics (but we can certainly know a lot about the physical universe, if only we would define knowledge differently than in math, which is pretty much what every philosophy does). The point I was making is that you can't blindly overlay mathematical concepts on the real world merely because they use similar terminology. Particularly, the definition of "truth" is inevitably different in math and in science, if only because science does not have the concept of the axiom, which is a core principle in the definition of mathematical truth. You cannot directly apply your notion of truth from logic to the physical universe and vice versa. Even in your examples you're confusing two different notions of truth. We do not know that the earth orbits the sun in the same sense that we know that 2 + 2 = 4. The latter is simply an algebraic axiom of the field of real numbers, while the former is an application of scientific assumptions to observations. We can be content with both types of knowledge, but we cannot equate them. We can treat both as true, but they are not true in the same sense.