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At CloudFlare, we have a Trust & Safety team dedicated to dealing with the abuse of our network. We sit in front of more than 2 million sites. The vast majority
by eastdakota 12y ago
At CloudFlare, we have a Trust & Safety team dedicated to dealing with the abuse of our network. We sit in front of more than 2 million sites. The vast majority of them are not controversial (the site you're reading this on, for instance), but some are not.
The majority of the abuse requests we receive are DMCA requests, but we get other reports as well. Dealing with these requests is a hard problem because a large number of the abuse requests we receive turn out to be attackers trying to get the origin IP in order to circumvent our protection. As I've blogged about before (http://blog.cloudflare.com/thoughts-on-abuse http://blog.cloudflare.com/thoughts-on-abuse), we've designed an abuse system that attempts to act as a proxy: passing abuse requests to the customer and their host without exposing the customer's origin to attack.
Malware is one of the situations where we'll actually take content down because it is, per se, harmful. However, we also don't think terminating the customer who has malware hosted on their site is a good solution. Since we're a proxy, terminating the customer doesn't remove the malware from the Internet but instead just kicks the problem down the road to the host. Instead, we developed a system that replaces the infected URLs with a warning page to protect users. This has the ancillary benefit when a site is being used for botnet command and control of allowing us to gather data on machines that make up the botnet. This data is fed back into our system in order to better protect our customers and we're talking other organizations about a way of responsibly sharing this data.
Our Trust & Safety team works with trusted malware reporters regularly, including the team at Microsoft that handled the no-ip.com takedown. We will continue to adjust our process to walk the careful line between ensuring our network isn't causing per se harm while, at the same time, avoiding the risk of becoming a censor.
Matthew Prince / Co-founder & CEO, CloudFlare
- pktgen 12y agoMy own comments about your company are based on what I described in https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7880514 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7880514. Would you care to respond to my statements in that post?
- devicenull 12y agoAnd without your usual comment of "the attack traffic is not from our network, so it's not our problem".
- eastdakota 12y agoSure. Pardon the copy-and-paste reply, but it's a perfect opportunity for me to publish up a draft blog post I wrote half a year ago in anticipation of a Brian Krebs post on the topic of Booter sites. Brian's article didn't turn out nasty enough to warrant a response, but I've had the post sitting around in by drafts folder for a while and it addresses your points as well. ======== Why a Hunger Games-Like Vision for the Internet is Wrong Earlier this afternoon Brian Krebs, a well-respected security writer, published a story which, in part, calls for CloudFlare to censor the websites of a handful of our users [http://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/02/the-new-normal-200-400-gbps-ddos-attacks/ http://krebsonsecurity.com/2014/02/the-new-normal-200-400-gb...]. These websites are known as "booter" sites. The sites claim to offer point-and-click DDoS services. The thrust of Brian's argument is that CloudFlare is a hypocrite for allowing these sites that advertise DDoS services to be protected by our network while, at the same time, offering as a core feature the ability to stop DDoS attacks. Brian acknowledges that there's a bit more nuance to the argument. He understands that CloudFlare is not a hosting provider and that terminating any customer wouldn't make the content of the booter sites go away, it would just make them slower and more vulnerable to attack. He also acknowledges that no attack traffic actually originates from CloudFlare's network. His assumption, which we discussed at length before he published the article, is that if CloudFlare weren't in the equation then the booter sites would simply DDoS each other into oblivion. Stop for a second and think about that: Brian is arguing for a Hunger Games-like vision of the Internet. It's the functional equivalent of if the police stopped prosecuting crimes committed against people they suspected to be criminals. Brian is not the first person to make this argument and he won't be the last. A few weeks ago Kayne West's attorneys contacted CloudFlare insisting that we terminate protection for a customer they said was causing irreparable harm to their client: the parody crypto currency called Coinye. Ken Carter, our legal counsel, explained to Mr. West's lawyers that terminating the Coinye CloudFlare account wouldn't make it go away, it would just make it more vulnerable to attack. They thought that would be terrific. Ken respectfully disagreed. CloudFlare's mission is to build a better Internet. Inherently there is content on our network that I find distasteful or even harmful. In the past, we've been called to task by other journalists [http://blog.cloudflare.com/cloudflare-and-free-speech http://blog.cloudflare.com/cloudflare-and-free-speech] for allowing controversial websites to use our network. There is currently a campaign that has gathered over 22,000 signatures [http://www.change.org/petitions/matthew-prince-remove-chimpmania-com-permanently http://www.change.org/petitions/matthew-prince-remove-chimpm...] for us to terminate the account of what I consider a horribly racist and distasteful website. While I, personally, agree that the site the petition was started over is truly awful, I don't believe my personal opinion of what is good or bad content should be what governs what is allowed online. If CloudFlare succeeds, even in small part, at building a better Internet, inherently we must honor and respect one of the Internet's greatest qualities: that it is a network open to anyone. Note that this isn't everyone's policy. Amazon, for instance, terminated Wikileak's account after political pressure [http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2010/dec/11/wikileaks-amazon-denial-democracy-lieberman http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2010/dec/11/wikileaks-...]. More recently an article circulated that they were censoring books where people fantasized about having sex with dinosaurs [http://observationdeck.io9.com/amazon-now-at-war-with-dinosaur-erotica-implication-1494585695 http://observationdeck.io9.com/amazon-now-at-war-with-dinosa...]. Other CDN providers are notorious for taking content offline at the first hint of pressure. We don't do that, even when the pressure comes from someone we truly respect like Brian. Fundamentally, we won't play the role of the Internet's morality cops. It's above our pay grade. Booter sites, you may argue, are different. But the key question is where do you draw the line. If a site says you can push a button and launch an attack should we take that down? What about one that has a phone number you can call? Or gives you instructions on launching the attack yourself? CloudFlare is many things, but one thing we are not is the Internet cops. Don't get me wrong, we don't believe in a lawless frontier. While we believe deeply in principles of due process and will push back against what we deem abusive legal requests [http://blog.cloudflare.com/fighting-back-responsibly http://blog.cloudflare.com/fighting-back-responsibly], ultimately if ordered by a court through valid legal process we will comply. While booter sites may be successful at using us to protect their content from being knocked offline by a DDoS attack, they will not be successful at using us to hide from law enforcement if they are breaking the law. Brian and I have known each other for almost a decade. He left the Washington Post and started Krebs On Security around the same time as we were launching CloudFlare. I actually tried to hire him back then. Thankfully he didn't accept the offer because he has become one of the leading security journalists writing anywhere today. He breaks important stories, which is something we need in the security space. On this issue, I respect Brian's opinion but think he's ultimately wrong, That said, I have no problem with him fostering the debate. I think the discussion is hard, but it is healthy and important. To that end, if there are any large security or technology conferences that would like to host such a debate between me and Brian on stage, just let me know when and where and I'm in.
- general_failure 12y agospam?
- cinskiy 12y agoTrust & Safety maybe, but it's still impossible to use CloudFlare in Russia, due to harboring some drug-selling websites at your services. ISPs ban them by IP, and taking whole subnetworks of websites that reside on the same IP down with them too. As much as I love your services, it's not possible to use them here, and ministry of communication even issued a recomendation not to use your services due to your unresponsiveness about takedown requests.