3 ms·
One is often able to inspect beyond that level. https://duckduckgo.com/?q=semiconductor+decapsulation https://duckduckgo.com/?q=semiconductor+decapsulation Th
by schoen 12y ago
One is often able to inspect beyond that level.
https://duckduckgo.com/?q=semiconductor+decapsulation https://duckduckgo.com/?q=semiconductor+decapsulation
The fact that these techniques do work fairly well for semiconductor reverse engineering is a reason that recent research on "stealthy dopant-level hardware Trojans" was scary.
http://www.iacr.org/workshops/ches/ches2013/presentations/CHES2013_Session4_3.pdf http://www.iacr.org/workshops/ches/ches2013/presentations/CH...
Though maybe that's what your reference to the inability to "seriously" inspect chips refers to. :-)
This research produces optically indistinguishable ICs with different electrical properties, which hinders optical reverse engineering.
My impression is that there's still a semiconductor device reverse engineering technique which likely defeats this measure (FIB imaging)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Focused_ion_beam https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Focused_ion_beam
as well as some other microscopy techniques that might conceivably detect these differences, but that it's more difficult and expensive overall compared to optical imaging.
- schoen 12y agoI just saw on the cryptography mailing list that some researchers have succeeded in using both SEM and FIB to see the stealthy dopants: https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/508 https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/508 So maybe the dopants have to get even stealthier if they're to avoid expert semiconductor reverse engineers. :-)