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Accepting that we have free will means that "could have done otherwise" explanations have a legitimate place in our moral thought. I don't think it makes a dif

Accepting that we have free will means that "could have done otherwise" explanations have a legitimate place in our moral thought. I don't think it makes a difference. "Free will" or not, the validity of "could have done otherwise" explanations remain unchanged. As long as physics permits, indeed, they "could have done otherwise", but ultimately, the stream of bytes that steer our machinations (be they predetermined or divinely inspired) result in some action being taken based on input from the environment. I also disagree that human morality is capable of responding to the absolute nature of our choices, regardless of their fundamental constituents (see my answer to sapient) A theory that explains what "could have saved them" means in that context is a theory of free will. What could have saved them is a different set of input or a different algorithm processing that input. If you can even conceive of a situation in which you would not save them, but then another one in which you would, you've implicitly acknowledged a state change in the private instance variables that underpin your decision making process, even if it's a change as subtle as "I just felt like it".

chrisdevereux 12y ago
> I don't think it makes a difference. "Free will" or not, the validity of "could have done otherwise" explanations remain unchanged You misunderstand. I am defining "free will" as the property that makes people moral agents --- ie. able to do otherwise in such a way that features in (some peoples') moral judgements. I am not claiming that we in fact possess this property (I think that's an open question). It isn't a substantial account of what free will is. It's a bit more meta: an account of what a substantial account of free will is. Which is important, because as you said yourself: what the hell does 'free will' even mean? Imagine you're trying to understand a codebase with as much legacy baggage as human thought. You do so by identifying modules, finding out what depends on each one and what it depends on, testing and later maybe improving on it, or discarding it. Free will is one of those modules and before we try to 'fix' it, we need to know what it does.
- vectorpush 12y ago
  You misunderstand. I am defining "free will" as the property that makes people moral agents --- ie. able to do otherwise in such a way that features in (some peoples') moral judgements. I am not claiming that we in fact possess this property (I think that's an open question). My point is that all conceivable systems of human morality are equally incapable of distinguishing between humans that possess "the property that makes them moral agents" and those that do not. If the universe is deterministic, then human morality is just another link in the chain. Morality cannot address the fundamental nature of our choices because it exists in a system where the only available input are the consequences of and the perceived motivations for human behaviors. Hitler didn't accidentally slaughter European Jews, his hateful feelings and aspirations for power drove him to towards those actions, even if he didn't choose to be hateful and power hungry. The state of determinism does not modify the criteria for moral judgement. Imagine you're trying to understand a codebase with as much legacy baggage as human thought. You do so by identifying modules, finding out what depends on each one and what it depends on, testing and later maybe improving on it, or discarding it. Free will is one of those modules and before we try to 'fix' it, we need to know what it does. In that analogy, I don't think you can describe free will as a module, contemplating free will is more like asking "is the x86 instruction set etched into the processor or is there a homunculus living in the chip that reads incoming instructions and executes them appropriately". The answer to that question has no bearing on whether or not we judge the "human thought program" to be malware (e.g. for corrupting the memory space of another program), what we do is first decide "what was the intention of this program?" and then assess if the memory corruption is a bug or the program's intentionally destructive payload. The absolute nature of the instruction execution mechanism doesn't really matter with regard to how we form judgments about which programs we can all agree are damaging to benign programs and thus a threat to the stability of the system as a whole.

chrisdevereux 12y ago

> I don't think it makes a difference. "Free will" or not, the validity of "could have done otherwise" explanations remain unchanged You misunderstand. I am defining "free will" as the property that makes people moral agents --- ie. able to do otherwise in such a way that features in (some peoples') moral judgements. I am not claiming that we in fact possess this property (I think that's an open question). It isn't a substantial account of what free will is. It's a bit more meta: an account of what a substantial account of free will is. Which is important, because as you said yourself: what the hell does 'free will' even mean? Imagine you're trying to understand a codebase with as much legacy baggage as human thought. You do so by identifying modules, finding out what depends on each one and what it depends on, testing and later maybe improving on it, or discarding it. Free will is one of those modules and before we try to 'fix' it, we need to know what it does.

vectorpush 12y ago
You misunderstand. I am defining "free will" as the property that makes people moral agents --- ie. able to do otherwise in such a way that features in (some peoples') moral judgements. I am not claiming that we in fact possess this property (I think that's an open question). My point is that all conceivable systems of human morality are equally incapable of distinguishing between humans that possess "the property that makes them moral agents" and those that do not. If the universe is deterministic, then human morality is just another link in the chain. Morality cannot address the fundamental nature of our choices because it exists in a system where the only available input are the consequences of and the perceived motivations for human behaviors. Hitler didn't accidentally slaughter European Jews, his hateful feelings and aspirations for power drove him to towards those actions, even if he didn't choose to be hateful and power hungry. The state of determinism does not modify the criteria for moral judgement. Imagine you're trying to understand a codebase with as much legacy baggage as human thought. You do so by identifying modules, finding out what depends on each one and what it depends on, testing and later maybe improving on it, or discarding it. Free will is one of those modules and before we try to 'fix' it, we need to know what it does. In that analogy, I don't think you can describe free will as a module, contemplating free will is more like asking "is the x86 instruction set etched into the processor or is there a homunculus living in the chip that reads incoming instructions and executes them appropriately". The answer to that question has no bearing on whether or not we judge the "human thought program" to be malware (e.g. for corrupting the memory space of another program), what we do is first decide "what was the intention of this program?" and then assess if the memory corruption is a bug or the program's intentionally destructive payload. The absolute nature of the instruction execution mechanism doesn't really matter with regard to how we form judgments about which programs we can all agree are damaging to benign programs and thus a threat to the stability of the system as a whole.