5 ms·

I will never understand this obsession with the concept of "free will". What the hell does the term "free will" even mean? In my non-expert opinion, apparent fr

I will never understand this obsession with the concept of "free will". What the hell does the term "free will" even mean? In my non-expert opinion, apparent free will is indistinguishable from any other description of "free will". I am thrown into existence, then I absorb information about how the environment works, then I make decisions based on that information. How else could it be? If my locus of control exists outside my physical brain, how useful could it possibly be since the data I use to make ALL decisions is stored in my physical brain? If we propose that information is also stored in some type of cosmic non-corporeal spirit-brain, nothing really changes, the same questions of agency simply move from the physical brain to the realm of the inexplicable spirit-brain.

Sapient 12y ago
I think the interesting and more important questions that stem from this are around the consequences of not having free will. Are we punishing people for doing things they were unable to NOT do? As Sam Harris said in his talk on free will, if a crocodile bit your hand off, you wouldnt 'blame' the crocodile, you wouldnt demand it be put down, and you may even take your family to see the crocodile saying 'See, thats the bugger who bit my hand off'. If we have no free will, then a human killer is as much to 'blame' for killing as the crocodile is.
- dllthomas 12y ago
  Most humans are susceptible to various kinds of social pressure, which is what "blame" amounts to. Crocodiles are not. This is a fact about the possibly deterministic physical instantiations of humans and crocodiles, and is independent of whether that determinism is - in fact - present or absent. To my mind, people care about free will because one or both of: 1) They want there to be space for a soul to be really guiding actions (otherwise God is punishing souls for no reason, and that breaks some theologies). Other dualist notions can also have troubles here. 2) They confuse physical determinism with classical determinism. Think Greek mythology; if something was fated, it would happen "whatever you do" - which motivates despair, "so why bother?", &c (for the Greeks, the answer was Virtue Ethics). In physical determinism, your actions are a part of what's "fated" - including your reflecting on determinism, including your making whatever decision you make - but if you were a different you, and made a different decision, or didn't try as hard, or tried harder, that would lead to a different outcome, so while you are uncertain about what you're deciding, you're also uncertain about the outcome, and you need very much to try.
  - vbit 12y ago
    I think I'm in camp #2, and I lost you at 'but if you were a different you, and made a different decision..'. If your thoughts and actions are fated, how can you be a different you? Or try harder? Isn't all that fated? First you tell me that I don't have real choice, but then you tell me to exercise that choice.
    - dllthomas 12y ago
      The "if" in "if you were a different you" is meant as a hypothetical counterfactual. My point is that the outcome is a function of (you, stuff that isn't you) - not, as in classical determinism, (stuff that isn't you). There is certainly a sense in which you "couldn't have been" a different you. But that doesn't change the fact that - insofar as there is a you - your actions and the results thereof follow from that you. That the you that is follows from other things is immaterial in regard to 2 (it is material in regard to 1). It boils down to this - what is a choice? I would contend that you do have a real choice and that the choice is made by you - again, insofar as there is a "you". It just happens to be the case (assuming determinism) that one could know what that choice was going to be, if they possessed more knowledge than anyone actually has.
      - vbit 12y ago
        > That the you that is follows from other things is immaterial in regard to 2 (it is material in regard to 1). I don't see it that way. The you that is follows from the (you, stuff that isn't you) at the previous moment. Your actions and the results are both a consequence of the previous (you, stuff that isn't you). In other words, I'm having trouble differentiating you from the stuff that isn't you. I just imagine the world is a giant mechanical machine, churning along according to some physical laws, where the you is just a conscious entity that identifies itself with small subset of atoms in the machine and believes it can affect the movement of those atoms.
        dllthomas 12y ago
        You're arguing that there isn't a "you". Sure, you're not a first order entity in the universe. When you do draw some line and say "this is me" - which is completely appropriate (if partly arbitrary) - and around particular events that you call actions, the actions taken by you depend on you, which is the important thing in 2.
- vectorpush 12y ago
  I think the interesting and more important questions that stem from this are around the consequences of not having free will. I don't think that question is more interesting or important because I don't think it makes a tangible inquiry. A universe with free will looks exactly the same as one without. What do we care about when we ask "are we truly responsible for our actions?" What is the distinction between true responsibility and deterministic responsibility? Whether you freely decided to reply to my comment or were determined to do so based on an unbroken chain of physical events since the beginning of the universe, the logic behind your locomotion remains the same, a decision was calculated based on data stored in your physical/non-corporeal brain; if you had a choice, you would have done the same thing, if you didn't have a choice, you would have done the same thing. If we have no free will, then a human killer is as much to 'blame' for killing as the crocodile is. To me, the idea that moral culpability might hinge on the true nature of free will seems flawed since morality is a construct defined within the scope of physical consequences that arise from human behavior. We ascribe moral culpability to the human killer not because of their choice to kill, but because of our own perception that the killer understands what it means to take another life. You might say "more precisely, because of their choice to kill within the context of that understanding", but human morality is not equipped to consider the absolute nature of our choices. Be it a truly free decision or a determined one, the human killer's programming matches our description of morally wrong i.e. "understands what it means to take an innocent life, but does so anyway".
  - vbit 12y ago
    > We ascribe moral culpability to the human killer not because of their choice to kill, but because of our own perception that the killer understands what it means to take another life. Choice is most definitely a factor determining moral culpability. Consider a driver who drives into a pedestrian killing him, because at an unfortunate moment, the driver was paralyzed by an unexpected stroke. The driver witnessed the entire event with full understanding of what it means to take a life. Is he morally culpable? I would say no, because he was not in control. You can also imagine similar scenarios involving coercion or accidents. The key point is whether we are in control of our actions, or merely witnesses with the illusion of control. I don't see how this can be separated from moral culpability.
chrisdevereux 12y ago
> What the hell does the term "free will" even mean? Great question. You've more or less just articulated the philosophical problem of free will. Why do we care what the term 'free will' means? Mainly because the concept features heavily in the way we think about (and judge) human behaviour. If I fail to save a drowning person because I can't swim or am tied to a tree, most people would not judge me as morally responsible for them drowning. If I could have saved them, but didn't, most people would judge me as morally responsible. A theory that explains what "could have saved them" means in that context is a theory of free will. Accepting that we have free will means that "could have done otherwise" explanations have a legitimate place in our moral thought. Rejecting it means that we need to find alternative explanations for the moral difference between the two situations I described (or just deny that there's a relevant difference). Which is certainly possible, but counterintuitive to many (/most?) people.
- vectorpush 12y ago
  Accepting that we have free will means that "could have done otherwise" explanations have a legitimate place in our moral thought. I don't think it makes a difference. "Free will" or not, the validity of "could have done otherwise" explanations remain unchanged. As long as physics permits, indeed, they "could have done otherwise", but ultimately, the stream of bytes that steer our machinations (be they predetermined or divinely inspired) result in some action being taken based on input from the environment. I also disagree that human morality is capable of responding to the absolute nature of our choices, regardless of their fundamental constituents (see my answer to sapient) A theory that explains what "could have saved them" means in that context is a theory of free will. What could have saved them is a different set of input or a different algorithm processing that input. If you can even conceive of a situation in which you would not save them, but then another one in which you would, you've implicitly acknowledged a state change in the private instance variables that underpin your decision making process, even if it's a change as subtle as "I just felt like it".
  - chrisdevereux 12y ago
    > I don't think it makes a difference. "Free will" or not, the validity of "could have done otherwise" explanations remain unchanged You misunderstand. I am defining "free will" as the property that makes people moral agents --- ie. able to do otherwise in such a way that features in (some peoples') moral judgements. I am not claiming that we in fact possess this property (I think that's an open question). It isn't a substantial account of what free will is. It's a bit more meta: an account of what a substantial account of free will is. Which is important, because as you said yourself: what the hell does 'free will' even mean? Imagine you're trying to understand a codebase with as much legacy baggage as human thought. You do so by identifying modules, finding out what depends on each one and what it depends on, testing and later maybe improving on it, or discarding it. Free will is one of those modules and before we try to 'fix' it, we need to know what it does.

Sapient 12y ago

I think the interesting and more important questions that stem from this are around the consequences of not having free will. Are we punishing people for doing things they were unable to NOT do? As Sam Harris said in his talk on free will, if a crocodile bit your hand off, you wouldnt 'blame' the crocodile, you wouldnt demand it be put down, and you may even take your family to see the crocodile saying 'See, thats the bugger who bit my hand off'. If we have no free will, then a human killer is as much to 'blame' for killing as the crocodile is.

dllthomas 12y ago
Most humans are susceptible to various kinds of social pressure, which is what "blame" amounts to. Crocodiles are not. This is a fact about the possibly deterministic physical instantiations of humans and crocodiles, and is independent of whether that determinism is - in fact - present or absent. To my mind, people care about free will because one or both of: 1) They want there to be space for a soul to be really guiding actions (otherwise God is punishing souls for no reason, and that breaks some theologies). Other dualist notions can also have troubles here. 2) They confuse physical determinism with classical determinism. Think Greek mythology; if something was fated, it would happen "whatever you do" - which motivates despair, "so why bother?", &c (for the Greeks, the answer was Virtue Ethics). In physical determinism, your actions are a part of what's "fated" - including your reflecting on determinism, including your making whatever decision you make - but if you were a different you, and made a different decision, or didn't try as hard, or tried harder, that would lead to a different outcome, so while you are uncertain about what you're deciding, you're also uncertain about the outcome, and you need very much to try.
- vbit 12y ago
  I think I'm in camp #2, and I lost you at 'but if you were a different you, and made a different decision..'. If your thoughts and actions are fated, how can you be a different you? Or try harder? Isn't all that fated? First you tell me that I don't have real choice, but then you tell me to exercise that choice.
  - dllthomas 12y ago
    The "if" in "if you were a different you" is meant as a hypothetical counterfactual. My point is that the outcome is a function of (you, stuff that isn't you) - not, as in classical determinism, (stuff that isn't you). There is certainly a sense in which you "couldn't have been" a different you. But that doesn't change the fact that - insofar as there is a you - your actions and the results thereof follow from that you. That the you that is follows from other things is immaterial in regard to 2 (it is material in regard to 1). It boils down to this - what is a choice? I would contend that you do have a real choice and that the choice is made by you - again, insofar as there is a "you". It just happens to be the case (assuming determinism) that one could know what that choice was going to be, if they possessed more knowledge than anyone actually has.
    - vbit 12y ago
      > That the you that is follows from other things is immaterial in regard to 2 (it is material in regard to 1). I don't see it that way. The you that is follows from the (you, stuff that isn't you) at the previous moment. Your actions and the results are both a consequence of the previous (you, stuff that isn't you). In other words, I'm having trouble differentiating you from the stuff that isn't you. I just imagine the world is a giant mechanical machine, churning along according to some physical laws, where the you is just a conscious entity that identifies itself with small subset of atoms in the machine and believes it can affect the movement of those atoms.
      - dllthomas 12y ago
        You're arguing that there isn't a "you". Sure, you're not a first order entity in the universe. When you do draw some line and say "this is me" - which is completely appropriate (if partly arbitrary) - and around particular events that you call actions, the actions taken by you depend on you, which is the important thing in 2.
vectorpush 12y ago
I think the interesting and more important questions that stem from this are around the consequences of not having free will. I don't think that question is more interesting or important because I don't think it makes a tangible inquiry. A universe with free will looks exactly the same as one without. What do we care about when we ask "are we truly responsible for our actions?" What is the distinction between true responsibility and deterministic responsibility? Whether you freely decided to reply to my comment or were determined to do so based on an unbroken chain of physical events since the beginning of the universe, the logic behind your locomotion remains the same, a decision was calculated based on data stored in your physical/non-corporeal brain; if you had a choice, you would have done the same thing, if you didn't have a choice, you would have done the same thing. If we have no free will, then a human killer is as much to 'blame' for killing as the crocodile is. To me, the idea that moral culpability might hinge on the true nature of free will seems flawed since morality is a construct defined within the scope of physical consequences that arise from human behavior. We ascribe moral culpability to the human killer not because of their choice to kill, but because of our own perception that the killer understands what it means to take another life. You might say "more precisely, because of their choice to kill within the context of that understanding", but human morality is not equipped to consider the absolute nature of our choices. Be it a truly free decision or a determined one, the human killer's programming matches our description of morally wrong i.e. "understands what it means to take an innocent life, but does so anyway".
- vbit 12y ago
  > We ascribe moral culpability to the human killer not because of their choice to kill, but because of our own perception that the killer understands what it means to take another life. Choice is most definitely a factor determining moral culpability. Consider a driver who drives into a pedestrian killing him, because at an unfortunate moment, the driver was paralyzed by an unexpected stroke. The driver witnessed the entire event with full understanding of what it means to take a life. Is he morally culpable? I would say no, because he was not in control. You can also imagine similar scenarios involving coercion or accidents. The key point is whether we are in control of our actions, or merely witnesses with the illusion of control. I don't see how this can be separated from moral culpability.

chrisdevereux 12y ago

> What the hell does the term "free will" even mean? Great question. You've more or less just articulated the philosophical problem of free will. Why do we care what the term 'free will' means? Mainly because the concept features heavily in the way we think about (and judge) human behaviour. If I fail to save a drowning person because I can't swim or am tied to a tree, most people would not judge me as morally responsible for them drowning. If I could have saved them, but didn't, most people would judge me as morally responsible. A theory that explains what "could have saved them" means in that context is a theory of free will. Accepting that we have free will means that "could have done otherwise" explanations have a legitimate place in our moral thought. Rejecting it means that we need to find alternative explanations for the moral difference between the two situations I described (or just deny that there's a relevant difference). Which is certainly possible, but counterintuitive to many (/most?) people.

vectorpush 12y ago
Accepting that we have free will means that "could have done otherwise" explanations have a legitimate place in our moral thought. I don't think it makes a difference. "Free will" or not, the validity of "could have done otherwise" explanations remain unchanged. As long as physics permits, indeed, they "could have done otherwise", but ultimately, the stream of bytes that steer our machinations (be they predetermined or divinely inspired) result in some action being taken based on input from the environment. I also disagree that human morality is capable of responding to the absolute nature of our choices, regardless of their fundamental constituents (see my answer to sapient) A theory that explains what "could have saved them" means in that context is a theory of free will. What could have saved them is a different set of input or a different algorithm processing that input. If you can even conceive of a situation in which you would not save them, but then another one in which you would, you've implicitly acknowledged a state change in the private instance variables that underpin your decision making process, even if it's a change as subtle as "I just felt like it".
- chrisdevereux 12y ago
  > I don't think it makes a difference. "Free will" or not, the validity of "could have done otherwise" explanations remain unchanged You misunderstand. I am defining "free will" as the property that makes people moral agents --- ie. able to do otherwise in such a way that features in (some peoples') moral judgements. I am not claiming that we in fact possess this property (I think that's an open question). It isn't a substantial account of what free will is. It's a bit more meta: an account of what a substantial account of free will is. Which is important, because as you said yourself: what the hell does 'free will' even mean? Imagine you're trying to understand a codebase with as much legacy baggage as human thought. You do so by identifying modules, finding out what depends on each one and what it depends on, testing and later maybe improving on it, or discarding it. Free will is one of those modules and before we try to 'fix' it, we need to know what it does.