I don't know if any respected analytic philosophers take moral relativism seriously (...) Well, many contemporary metaethicists argue that forms of moral relat

I don't know if any respected analytic philosophers take moral relativism seriously (...) Well, many contemporary metaethicists argue that forms of moral relativism undergird / best justify non-cognivitism [1,2], for one. Also Gilbert Harman [3] and David Wong [4] have proposed that forms of moral relativism are associated with naturalism (!), and their work overall is an excellent reference I strongly recommend you check out. [1] http://stanford.library.usyd.edu.au/entries/moral-relativism/ http://stanford.library.usyd.edu.au/entries/moral-relativism... [2] http://stanford.library.usyd.edu.au/entries/moral-cognitivism/ http://stanford.library.usyd.edu.au/entries/moral-cognitivis... [3] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gilbert_Harman http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gilbert_Harman [4] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Wong_(philosopher) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Wong_(philosopher)