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> I don't know if any respected analytic philosophers take moral relativism seriously as philosophy; you can't ground the foundational meaning of the word 'goo
by baddox 12y ago
> I don't know if any respected analytic philosophers take moral relativism seriously as philosophy; you can't ground the foundational meaning of the word 'good' as 'different cultures think different things are good', since there's no base case for the recursion.
Wouldn't the meaning of "good" be "considered to be good by the given culture, group, or individual"?
> Well-known mainstream positions in metaethics hold that moral language is not meant to express statements which are either true or false, i.e., it is not semantic or truth-apt;
Do you have any data on the percentage of philosophers who subscribe to various beliefs? It sounds like you're describing non-cognitivism, which I'm fairly familiar with, although I didn't think it was a widely accepted view.
- wfn 12y agoTake a look at PhilPapers Surveys, maybe: http://philpapers.org/surveys/ http://philpapers.org/surveys/ the rough gist (from http://philpapers.org/archive/BOUWDP.pdf http://philpapers.org/archive/BOUWDP.pdf) seems to be 14. Meta-ethics: moral realism 56.4%; moral anti-realism 17. Moral judgment: cognitivism 65.7%; non-cognitivism 17.0%; other 17.3%. The results are also here: http://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl http://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl (set response grain to "fine" as the note at the top suggests) correlation results should also be interesting.