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I would like the protocol to be secure to the point that an attacker possessing a stolen hard drive with the database containing users' passwords on it, would b
by cryptonewbie 17y ago
I would like the protocol to be secure to the point that an attacker possessing a stolen hard drive with the database containing users' passwords on it, would be unable to either a) figure out what the plaintext password of any user is, or b) generate a new password such that it, when put through the protocol, results in the same hashed/encrypted password of a user.
If they can install a root kit, perform a cold boot attack or something similar (access the RAM), I'm willing to concede to them.
- cperciva 17y agoNow we're getting somewhere. :-) When a user's password is set, generate a random salt, compute K = scrypt(salt, password), and store (user, salt, K) in your database. To verify a password, look up the user's salt value, compute K' = scrypt(salt, password'), and compare K' to K. You don't need this much strength, but as a matter of course I would recommend using a 256-bit salt and a 256-bit output from scrypt -- the reasoning being that using 256 bits isn't going to be a performance-limiting factor, and that if you try to figure out exactly how many bits you need, there's a risk that you'll make a mistake. If you can't use scrypt, I'd recommend PBKDF2-SHA256; if that's also unavailable, use bcrypt.
- cryptonewbie 17y agoThanks!