I'm a crypto novice, but from my (layperson) reading here is how the Google approach addresses the points made in this article: - chicken and egg problem: bein

I'm a crypto novice, but from my (layperson) reading here is how the Google approach addresses the points made in this article: - chicken and egg problem: being a browser extension, the code for End to End is distributed up front, when you do (presumably) trust the server. If the server is compromised in the meantime, you are not affected. Also, you could download the extension from a source you do trust and then use it on websites that you don't trust. - content-controlled code / malleable runtime: End to End, as a browser extension, isolates itself from the code/content of actual websites. - no RNG: "CS-PRNG is available thanks to WebCrypto." - secure erasure: "The threat model we are trying to address discounts adversaries with physical access and users with malware outside the browser. Chrome’s design means that extensions should be safe against other extensions. Adversaries with this level of access have a plethora of attacks available to compromise data even in systems that control their memory carefully and wipe it." - no secure keystore: ? (I don't know) - timing and other side-channel attacks: "End-To-End requires user interaction for private operations in normal use, mitigating this risk. Non-user-interaction actions are rate-limited and done in fixed time. End-To-End’s crypto operations are performed in a different process from the web apps it interacts with. The End-To-End library is as timing-aware it can be and we’ve invested effort to mitigate any exploitable risk."