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The two explanations don't contradict each other. In fact, it's clear that self-interest and a "filter bubble" à la déformation professionnelle would reinforce
by jessaustin 12y ago
The two explanations don't contradict each other. In fact, it's clear that self-interest and a "filter bubble" à la déformation professionnelle would reinforce each other. Why take such pains to differentiate between the two?
- rayiner 12y agoBecause the "self-interest" angle is intellectually lazy and in this case very attenuated. There's only so much self-interest you can ascribe to someone with a Constitutionally-guaranteed salary fixed by statute.
- jessaustin 12y agoClicking through the wikipedia link provided below, I find that six of the twelve non-senior members of the court are described as having worked as patent lawyers, taught patent law, or worked for the USPTO. Several others are described as having worked for firms that do patent law, although their specific duties while there are not described. The point is that after self-interest affects one's thinking during the first several decades of one's career, one is unlikely to have a contrarian epiphany after appointment to this court.
- pdabbadabba 12y agoI think this is basically right, though I want to point out that this is not the same as self interest or corruption -- it's an instance of institutional bias. If I'm understanding you correctly, your argument (which I agree with) is that judges from the backgrounds that you list have spent years steeping in a certain intellectual environment where, simplistically, everyone is a patent maximalist (or, similarly, where nobody questions the fundamentals of the patent regime). They won't immediately (if ever) lose this mindset once they're appointed to the bench. The only reason this distinction matters, I suppose, is that it is fairer to the judges themselves than calling them "corrupt" or "self-interested." It's not the judges' fault if they have worked at patent firms for 30 years before they're appointed. It's the fault of the people appointing them for not selecting from a more intellectually diverse set of candidates.
- rayiner 12y agoI only count two who worked in private practice as patent lawyers. Working in-house or teaching results in a very different set of incentives. What does my criminal law professor or my securities law professor think about criminal or securities laws? That we should have them? Probably. That they should always be stronger? Quite often the opposite.
- jessaustin 12y agoWorking in-house or teaching results in a very different set of incentives. Working in-house does not result in different incentives, any more than slip-and-fall defense lawyers want to see tort reform happen, which is not at all.
- rayiner 12y agoIn-house patent counsel doesn't defend patent litigations. That is done by outside counsel. They mostly deal with licensing and the like. They have a general interest in patents continuing to exist, obviously, but, especially at large companies, not any particular interest in seeing more or less litigation. Patent defense counsel definitely does have an interest in more patent litigation, but the Fed. Cir.'s decisions don't exactly serve that interest. As a litigator, you prefer fuzzy rights to clearer stronger ones. The Fed. Cir. has been making patent rights stronger, but has also been trying to draw more bright-line rules. The Supreme Court has tended to want finer distinctions to be made, which lead to more litigation, not less.