6 ms·

You mean that DDG offers the illusion of privacy, right? It's more than a little naive to think that the NSA won't be able to pull data without needing the coop

You mean that DDG offers the illusion of privacy, right? It's more than a little naive to think that the NSA won't be able to pull data without needing the cooperation of DDG (and they're obviously not dissuaded from doing so by any laws). We also don't know about any secret court orders that may or may not have been issued to DDG compelling them to turn over data. And how are we supposed to know that DDG haven't done a deal with Microsoft to pass on data under threat of being closed down, or even that they follow their stated privacy policy? I'm not suggesting that any of these scenarios have necessarily taken place, but we'd have no way of knowing if they have. Also, the more popular DDG becomes, the more tempting a target it becomes to the NSA et al. So by all means use DDG if you like its other features, but try to be realistic about privacy.

LeoPanthera 12y ago
That doesn't mean we should do nothing. Using DDG may make it harder for the NSA - and that's a start. At least we're trying. For many people, the NSA isn't even the problem. Google is the problem.
weavejester 12y ago
"It's more than a little naive to think that the NSA won't be able to pull data without needing the cooperation of DDG" How would they do this? It's possible there are SSL flaws the NSA knows about that the public does not, but I can't think of many other ways the NSA could achieve this through technological means. There could be a secret court order forcing DDG to place monitoring hardware on their internal network, but given that they're basing a business on privacy, this would be corporate suicide. DDG aren't behaving in a manner that suggests they believe they're living on borrowed time.
- lubujackson 12y ago
  Since we know they tap ISPs like Comcast directly and have placed backdoors in SSL certificates, why wouldn't they just hoover everything?
  - weavejester 12y ago
    "Backdoors in SSL certificates"? Are you talking about flaws inserted in SSL software, such as OpenSSL? Or do you mean that they likely have root certificates they can use to perform MITM attacks? The problem with a MITM attack is that it involves changing the message stream. It's not a passive attack. A MITM attack is unsuitable for wide-scale surveillance, as it would almost certainly be noticed.
    - dredmorbius 12y ago
      Rumblings I've heard are compromised roots, or entropy attacks, enabling MITM. SSL/TLS are pretty creaky as it is.
      - weavejester 12y ago
        MITM attacks aren't suitable for mass surveillance. All it would take is for a DDG employee to check the certificate from outside their network and the game would be up. Not only would you know the NSA was using a MITM attack on a global scale, you'd have absolute proof of it. The NSA might be using a zero-day flaw to passively listen in on connections, but the possibility of this will diminish once the OCAP gets around to finishing its audit of OpenSSL.
jeorgun 12y ago
Pretty much their entire pitch is that they don't store the data[1]. I don't really see how they can be forced to give up data they don't have. [1] https://duckduckgo.com/privacy#s3 https://duckduckgo.com/privacy#s3
- VMG 12y ago
  I don't see how you can be certain that they don't store the data if government can easily force them to and make them shut up about it.
S4M 12y ago
When I think of privacy, I don't think too much of the NSA. Rather, I am much more concerned about Google storing every search I do to show me more relevant ads, because, hey, I'm not comfortable with being sold to advertisers. Now, if I was really paranoid about NSA or wanted to hide stuff, I would use much more radical measures - say: using linux Tails, only browsing with Tor, and possibly from a public network whenever possible (in order to use a different IP each time). For me, DDG is a decent middle ground. I suppose the NSA could track my search history if they really wanted to, but meanwhile it's a bit harder for them and I am less targeted by advertisement.
dredmorbius 12y ago
With Google, you've got tracking cookies, logged-in sessions, and IP-based tracking to deal with. For DDG, with a surveillance proxy installed, you're limited to IP + browser fingerprinting. You can largely defeat both with the addition of privoxy and TOR. I agree that, were DDG compelled to install monitoring equipment, their assurances are fairly thin defense. But they are an improvement over the status quo. Meanwhile, you'll also escape the sort of snooping and across-the-net following side-effects of advertising and marketing: https://smoncelle.wordpress.com/2014/04/28/hiding-a-pregnancy-from-big-data-might-get-you-flagged-as-a-criminal/ https://smoncelle.wordpress.com/2014/04/28/hiding-a-pregnanc... DDG's claims of not tracking are auditable, though I'm not aware that they've actually been audited. It absolutely is a step in the right direction.

LeoPanthera 12y ago

That doesn't mean we should do nothing. Using DDG may make it harder for the NSA - and that's a start. At least we're trying. For many people, the NSA isn't even the problem. Google is the problem.

weavejester 12y ago

"It's more than a little naive to think that the NSA won't be able to pull data without needing the cooperation of DDG" How would they do this? It's possible there are SSL flaws the NSA knows about that the public does not, but I can't think of many other ways the NSA could achieve this through technological means. There could be a secret court order forcing DDG to place monitoring hardware on their internal network, but given that they're basing a business on privacy, this would be corporate suicide. DDG aren't behaving in a manner that suggests they believe they're living on borrowed time.

lubujackson 12y ago
Since we know they tap ISPs like Comcast directly and have placed backdoors in SSL certificates, why wouldn't they just hoover everything?
- weavejester 12y ago
  "Backdoors in SSL certificates"? Are you talking about flaws inserted in SSL software, such as OpenSSL? Or do you mean that they likely have root certificates they can use to perform MITM attacks? The problem with a MITM attack is that it involves changing the message stream. It's not a passive attack. A MITM attack is unsuitable for wide-scale surveillance, as it would almost certainly be noticed.
  - dredmorbius 12y ago
    Rumblings I've heard are compromised roots, or entropy attacks, enabling MITM. SSL/TLS are pretty creaky as it is.
    - weavejester 12y ago
      MITM attacks aren't suitable for mass surveillance. All it would take is for a DDG employee to check the certificate from outside their network and the game would be up. Not only would you know the NSA was using a MITM attack on a global scale, you'd have absolute proof of it. The NSA might be using a zero-day flaw to passively listen in on connections, but the possibility of this will diminish once the OCAP gets around to finishing its audit of OpenSSL.

jeorgun 12y ago

Pretty much their entire pitch is that they don't store the data[1]. I don't really see how they can be forced to give up data they don't have. [1] https://duckduckgo.com/privacy#s3 https://duckduckgo.com/privacy#s3

VMG 12y ago
I don't see how you can be certain that they don't store the data if government can easily force them to and make them shut up about it.

S4M 12y ago

When I think of privacy, I don't think too much of the NSA. Rather, I am much more concerned about Google storing every search I do to show me more relevant ads, because, hey, I'm not comfortable with being sold to advertisers. Now, if I was really paranoid about NSA or wanted to hide stuff, I would use much more radical measures - say: using linux Tails, only browsing with Tor, and possibly from a public network whenever possible (in order to use a different IP each time). For me, DDG is a decent middle ground. I suppose the NSA could track my search history if they really wanted to, but meanwhile it's a bit harder for them and I am less targeted by advertisement.

dredmorbius 12y ago

With Google, you've got tracking cookies, logged-in sessions, and IP-based tracking to deal with. For DDG, with a surveillance proxy installed, you're limited to IP + browser fingerprinting. You can largely defeat both with the addition of privoxy and TOR. I agree that, were DDG compelled to install monitoring equipment, their assurances are fairly thin defense. But they are an improvement over the status quo. Meanwhile, you'll also escape the sort of snooping and across-the-net following side-effects of advertising and marketing: https://smoncelle.wordpress.com/2014/04/28/hiding-a-pregnancy-from-big-data-might-get-you-flagged-as-a-criminal/ https://smoncelle.wordpress.com/2014/04/28/hiding-a-pregnanc... DDG's claims of not tracking are auditable, though I'm not aware that they've actually been audited. It absolutely is a step in the right direction.