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US cybercrime laws being used to target security researchers
- forgottenpass 12y agoMonied interests want you to play in their safe playground without rocking the boat, the legal and technical enforcement is closing in. Slowly, but the ratchet only turns one direction. I worry that the only reason it hasn't closed in entirely is that smart people exploring is more beneficial to business than not. For now. Over the last few weeks I've been wondering when the scale flips and general purpose computing will die outright. Things that were once considered forgone conclusions about tech are turning out to be accidents of the fact adoption starts with individuals. How long can tech empowering people continue to outrun the oldschool powers using tech to empower themselves?
- tptacek 12y agoThis is both a comment on vulnerability research and a credible System Of A Down song lyric.
- forgottenpass 12y agoYeah, it felt kinda trite writing it. I just haven't found a way to articulate the idea without asking myself "Oh, so you're still a teenager getting stoned every day thinking you have thoughts about things, hows that working out for you?" Edit: Maybe I should just lean into it and write a phrack article. I'm sorry, that's a low blow, I enjoyed phrack even when the writing style wasn't my speed.
- tptacek 12y agoI'll just note that the biggest "moneyed interests" in the technology industry have more or less waived most of their ammunition to stop research under the CFAA by posting public bug bounties. Not only have they made it much harder to sue researchers, but they also pay strangers to do it.
- AnthonyMouse 12y agoIt makes me wonder who actually likes the CFAA the way it is. Does anybody? I don't see how it's helping anybody. Most of the actually malicious computer intrusions come from outside of U.S. jurisdiction. It's like trying to reduce child labor in China by increasing the breadth of the offense and severity of the penalties in Texas. The next thing you know nothing has changed in China but a father in Texas is facing felony charges for having his son stock shelves at the family business. Who would actually oppose fixing that? Is it purely a lack of understanding the issue on the part of legislators?
- tptacek 12y agoThe CFAA exists because during the 1980s, there was a concern that no existing statute would deter purely malicious attacks on systems, or any other attack that didn't fit the narrow definition of wire fraud. I actually do not have a problem with the CFAA's statutory prohibitions on unauthorized access. They seem eminently sensible to me. Don't mess with systems that don't belong to you. I do think the CFAA has a grave and dangerous flaw: I think its sentencing makes absolutely no sense. I generally do not believe that computer crimes should have sentences that scale with the iterator in a "for()" loop. In the cases where sentences could reasonable scale along with the magnitude of the attack, the meaningful scaling factor should (and I think typically does, in a sane reading of the law) come from some other crime charged along with CFAA.
- AnthonyMouse 12y agoI agree that significantly reducing the penalties under the CFAA would mitigate almost all of the damage it causes, but I don't see how that makes the language any better. It just limits the damage. "Don't mess with systems that don't belong to you" worked much better in 1980 when typical computers cost a million dollars and were only expected to be used by the employees of the bank or government that owned them, because in that context you know you're authorized when you file a W2 and are issued a security badge. Once you put systems on the internet for access by the general public it changes everything. "Mess with systems that don't belong to you" is practically the definition of The Cloud. The defining question is no longer who is authorized, because everybody is authorized, so the question becomes what everybody is authorized to do. The problem is that nobody has any idea what that means in practice. All we can do is make some wild guesses -- maybe SQL injection against random servers of unsuspecting third parties is unauthorized access whereas typing "google.com" into a web browser without prior written permission from Google, Inc. is not. But what about changing your useragent string to Googlebot? What if that will bypass a paywall? What if that will bypass a paywall, but you're a web spider like the real Googlebot? What if you demonstrate a buffer overrun against the web host you use in order to prove their breach of a contract to keep the server patched? Can you charge a journalist for reading a company's internal documents when the company made its intranet server accessible to the internet without any authentication? The answers to these questions depend primarily on which judge is deciding the case. Which is ridiculous, and the hallmark of a bad piece of legislation.
- mikeash 12y agoDoes it really only turn in one direction, though? I hear that kind of talk a lot, usually about taxes and government programs. It seems incredibly depressing, for one thing. It's fundamentally saying that you can never win, just delay the inevitable loss. Fortunately, it doesn't seem to be true, whether it's taxes or computers. Computers might be getting squeezed a bit now, but there have been far worse periods, followed by better. Go back in time to, I don't know, 1990. You want an OS for your PC? Sure, Windows or DOS? You want a wide-area network connection of some kind? We have a variety of choices for you, ranging from the local phone company to the local phone company, or even the local phone company. Remember when you had to be careful never to tell the phone company that your second line was for dialup internet, because they'd charge you more if they found out you were going to use it with a modem? Remember when you had to worry that they'd figure it out anyway from your usage patterns, or that they'd just cut you off regardless because you were tying up a line for hours and hours every day? I don't want to tell you not to fight. Certainly, there are plenty of problems right now, and it's well worth fighting. But we should realize that there are many ways that it can be and has been worse, and that the ratchet really does go both ways when people want it to.
- djcapelis 12y agoI think my favorite example of things going the other way was when we more or less won the battle on export control laws which restricted the distribution of cryptography.
- mikeash 12y agoI momentarily forgot about that! You're right, though. Netscape International Edition, with 40-bit crypto for SSL. Good times.
- slashdotaccount 12y agohttps://xkcd.com/504/ https://xkcd.com/504/
- sp332 12y agoCory Doctorow's keynote at Chaos Communication Congress (2011) was about this trend. It's not technically feasible to make a turing-complete system that only does things that the creator likes. All anti-virus and DRM systems are provably limited unless general-purpose computation is removed. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HUEvRyemKSg https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HUEvRyemKSg
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- tptacek 12y agoNote that this concerns the subset of security research that involves actively talking to computer systems owned by other people, presumably in production, on the public Internet. Most security research does not in fact work this way. Consider, for instance, virtually any memory corruption vulnerability; while it was once straightforward (in the 90s) to work out an exploit "blind", today, researchers virtually always have their targets "up on blocks", connected to specialized debugging tools. I am a little surprised that we are only now hearing about high-profile researchers getting dinged for actively scanning for actual vulnerabilities in other people's deployed systems. It has pretty much always been unlawful to do that.† (These are descriptive comments, not normative ones. My take on unauthorized testing of systems in production is complicated, but does not mirror that of the CFAA). It's for this reason that you should be especially appreciative of firms, like Google and Facebook, that post public bug bounties and research pages --- those firms are essentially granting permission for anonymous researchers to test their systems. They don't have to do that. Without those notices, they have the force of law available to prevent people from conducting those tests. (Background, for what it's worth: full time vulnerability researcher, started in '94.) † Caveat: it does depend on the vulnerability you're testing for. There are a number of flaws you could test for that would be very difficult to make a case out of. But testing deployed systems without authorization is always risky.
- awakened 12y agoSo should someone find a remote exploit in OpenWhatever that gives them remote root access and they publicly disclose that (without having tested it on the Internet... just in their lab) then they are not subject to the CFAA?
- tptacek 12y agoCorrect. They are also probably (depending on circumstances) exempt from some provisions of the DMCA that might otherwise allow the research target to employ copyright law to stop them from conducting the research. US Federal Law has provisions that explicitly protect vulnerability research in some cases.
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- perlpimp 12y agothis is dumb on many layers - threatening white hat who could be held accountable but could be hired to do further audit; failing to come to grips that if you are insecure enough to threaten someone, you know - internet will find out that you rather than fixing holes in your system rather use expensive lawyers to intimidate people who on the whole trying to a good thing for you. The whole thing about unauthorized access - not sure about. If you get burglarized and live worse part of town - because you did not lock your front door - is this you fault or criminal's? Ultimately buck stops with you, you would look very stupid arguing that a stranger walked off the street and pinched your laptop, better yet, if you leave your laptop on your front lawn.
- esbranson 12y agoIt in no way diminishes the effect of a crime if a person does not lock their front door. It is not the victim's fault if they did not install bulletproof glass and employ a security guard. If you think differently you have a twisted outlook on life, a sort of might-makes-right view of righteousness. Such rationale is the rationale of a lowlife. "The front door was unlocked so its their fault I stole from them." "If they didn't want me to steal their lawnchair, they shouldn't have left it unchained on their porch." Nothing is inexcusable with that line of thinking. "If she didn't want to get raped, she shouldn't have been all alone in the middle of the night in a dark alleyway." "If he didn't want to get brutally assaulted, he shouldn't have left such a stupid comment on HN."
- npizzolato 12y agoAgreed. You don't get a pass for breaking into someone's house just because you say you weren't there to cause any harm. Yes, it's good to be pragmatic and understand that there's always something the owner of the house could have done to help prevent the break in -- close the door, lock them, get locks that are harder to pick, install security cameras, etc. etc. -- but the person breaking into your house is still wrong for doing so, even if they claim they just wanted to tell you about the weaknesses of your house's security. I don't see any reason the same reasoning shouldn't apply to digital property.
- esbranson 12y agoI think this article is misleading to British English readers. > HD Moore, creator of the ethical hacking tool Metasploit and chief research officer of security consultancy Rapid7, told the Guardian he had been warned by US law enforcement last year over a scanning project called Critical.IO, which he started in 2012. British might confuse "warning" for what's known in Britain as a "police caution", which is a extra-judicial criminal prosecution, judged summarily by police, and is also referred to as a "formal warning". Such warnings become part of their criminal record in the UK and effect things like employment, as they are in effect a criminal conviction (as I understand it, although the UK describes them as "not a criminal conviction but an admission of guilt [after being accused by the police]", which I view as an irrelevant distinction). There is no such system under federal law in the United States. A UK reader might rationally assume "police cautions" are just called "police warnings" or "US law enforcement warnings" in the US. Police cautions are not something most people in the US know about, and would probably be outraged to know of their existence. (In effect, the police say you admitted to a crime, so they go around telling everyone who asks that you're a criminal. Such as potential employers and landlords.) At least, to me, that's the implication of the statement.
- jt2190 12y ago> ...judged summarily by police... Wikipedia claims [1] that the offender can't be summarily judged by the police because they must agree to be cautioned: > In order to safeguard the offender's interests, the > following conditions must be met before a caution can be > administered: > * there must be evidence of guilt sufficient to give > a realistic prospect of conviction; > * the offender must admit the offence; > * the offender must understand the significance of a > caution and give informed consent to being > cautioned. Did you mean something else when you wrote "summarily judged?" Or does Wikipedia have this wrong? [1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Police_caution#Circumstances_for_use http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Police_caution#Circumstances_fo...
- esbranson 12y agoOnly if you think a guilty plea (in a court of law) doesn't result in a summary judgement because the offender agreed to it.
- lasermike026 12y agoCall your congress critter, form a PAC, and elected one of your own. If you are in a gerrymandered district, join the party that controls that district, and primary the congress critter out.
- esbranson 12y agoTake your rational thinking elsewhere. This is the Internet.
- Yardlink 12y agoA fundamental difference between online "property" and physical property is that you can never fully protect physical property. Build a stronger wall and someone can use a bigger bulldozer to break it. But build a secure website and you might find that it doesn't get hacked no matter the resources of the hacker. If it does, you have plans to limit the effects. I wonder if people are so busy rushing to do things online they don't want to pay the cost of strong security, so they let themselves be vulnerable and need laws to protect them. As a few people have said, foreign government hackers aren't bound by such laws and even they can't get in to many sites. If we stop seeing hackers as guilty people to blame, and think of them as an unavoidable natural presence on the internet, just like data corruption or power failures, then we won't need laws, instead we'll need safety standards and licenses for IT workers just as we do for, say gas plumbers. Every day, spammers "hack" my web forum by solving the captcha. I don't want to find them and send them to prison. I want to build better defenses to prevent them doing it.
- whatevsbro 12y agoI guess those targeted would be the ones not selling vulnerabilities to the government?
- anonymousDan 12y agoI disagree with people who are drawing direct analogies between someone breaking into your property to test its security and cyber security pen-testing. To me, it's more like giving your money to a bank for safe keeping with the understanding they will protect it, and then wanting to test they are actually fulfilling their promise (e.g. by going to the bank and checking they have solid thick walls, and that entry to the vault is guarded properly). Even that's not a direct analogy, as you'll likely be compensated if the bank loses your money, but you'll rarely be compensated when your personal information is disclosed. I also think there are some interesting questions raised by cloud computing. What if I were to deploy a purposefully insecure honeypot VM or application to the cloud, and an attacker managed to use that to mount an attack on other applications?
- esbranson 12y agoThere seems to be a fundamental disagreement about the correct analogy. Is it akin to going to a bank during normal business hours and using lawful powers of observation, i.e., implicitly authorized? Or is akin to breaking into the bank after its closed, or otherwise violating some implicit lack of authorization, e.g., going somewhere off-limits, such as trying to secretly enter the vault? Because I think you'll recognize the inherit danger of allowing people to willy-nilly try and break into banks to "test they are actually fulfilling their promise".