5 ms·
It's an interesting paper, but seemingly disconnected from at least two important facts about surveillance: 1. Strong encryption works and data in transit and
by Zigurd 12y ago
It's an interesting paper, but seemingly disconnected from at least two important facts about surveillance:
1. Strong encryption works and data in transit and at rest can be secured.
2. Node security doesn't work, and state actors are behaving irresponsibly by creating a market in insecurity by buying zero-day attacks. This is analogous to buying bioweapons from freelance laboratories and hoping nothing really bad happens. How do you "govern" a dangerous practice like that?
The article appears to assume that all nations will accept a subservient role in a monitored world. Nobody will want actual confidentiality for their government and industry. That doesn't seem plausible.
- joshfraser 12y agoStrong encryption works, but it's doesn't matter much if you can't trust your hardware, operating system, browser or network. Everything is broken.
- sliverstorm 12y agoStrong encryption works and data in transit and at rest can be secured. Hey, if we can capture the packets today, it's only a matter of time until quantum computers are brought online and AES256 is rendered as strong as wet paper. (Or so the gamble might go)
- tzs 12y agoFor symmetrical ciphers like AES, quantum computers effectively cut the key length in half for brute force attacks. If you used a good key with AES256, you do not need to worry much about quantum computers.
- tptacek 12y agoThat's true, and AES is a bad example of a QC threat, but if you're talking about packet captures, in practice AES is usually keyed by something that is very vulnerable to QC.