> The reason for this is simple: Sentence length isn't just retribution for the crime. It can be for rehabilitation as well (at least, in other countries). Pris

> The reason for this is simple: Sentence length isn't just retribution for the crime. It can be for rehabilitation as well (at least, in other countries). Prison sentences also try to have a deterrent effect. Thieves aren't caught nearly as often as murderers. If the punishment for theft was repayment and a fine, we'd see a lot more theft. It's a similar story with drunk driving. Most of the time, people get away with driving drunk. Nobody gets hurt, nobody gets pulled over. But we want to discourage this behavior since it does kill people. So we make harsh punishments for even a first-time offense. One obscene result of this paradigm is that you sacrifice the actual lives of individuals for merely potential benefits for society. The literary example is Jean Val Jean, who of course ends up spending a lifetime in prison for stealing a loaf of bread. This actually happens in American justice. Those harshly punished for minor offenses are not only not rehabilitated, they are turned into hardened criminals by association with the low-lifes who truly deserve to be in prison. > It's interesting that you bring up the example of Anders Breivik. How would your opinion of him change if, hypothetically, it were later shown that he had a brain tumor? For me, the justification for retribution evaporates. To extend your hypothetical, say we can conclusively prove that the universe is deterministic and there is no such thing as free will. Then is no one responsible for anything they do? I contend, in the absence of contradicting evidence, we must live as if we have free will, because (ironically) we have no other choice. So if Breivik's lawyers/doctors demonstrate a brain tumor affecting his behavior, we treat him differently than we do the garden-variety psychopathic mass-murderer he appears to (and purports to) be.