3 ms·
This is an interesting point. If you pay for performance, you have to measure performance over a long enough time. Stock options have a similar problem, actua
by pg 19y ago
This is an interesting point. If you pay for performance, you have to measure performance over a long enough time. Stock options have a similar problem, actually. What you should really do is pay people not for what they do to the stock price today, but what they do to it several years from now.
- soundsop 19y agoWhen you create incentives, you always have to be careful to find out exactly what scenarios maximize the rewards of those incentives. These scenarios may be unexpected (Freakonomics touches on this alot). Creating incentives that are short term or simply give rewards in the face of egregious errors is why CEO compensation today is a scam. Many CEOs don't expect to be at a company longer than a few years, so their horizon for increasing the stock price is short term, often hurting the company in the longer term. You can see this when companies have firesales to save a quarterly result, only to hurt the next few quarters. With the alternative being three mediocre quarters with no rewards, in some incentive system it's better to artificially pump up one quarter and tank the next two quarters. If stock options vested over a period of, say, 20 years, I wonder how the actions of CEOs would change? I'm not sure, but I think, on average, they would be vastly different than they are today. I'm reminded of an article about Costco, where the CEO (who is an unusual type of CEO) said that Wall Street was clamoring for him to raise his profit margins and reduce the pay of his employees. He thought that this strategy would definitely raise revenues in the short term and destroy the company in the long term, by opening up an opportunity for a competitor.
- davidw 19y agoWas it freakonomics, or elsewhere, where they mention the anthropologist who paid a flat rate for bone fragments? Apparently, the natives were pretty smart, so they took whole bones and smashed them to little bits, to get more money. Oops!
- cellis 19y agoThat is finance. People in that industry are trained to exploit the system at every turn. Very cool, considering its (mostly) a bunch of rich, snobby NYC people losing money.
- gojomo 19y agoCurrent-year bonuses could be paid in shares of the corporation/fund itself, and vest over the next several years, contingent on no major reversals based on the current-year strategies. That's two incentives -- core value and preserved vesting -- to seek enduring gains. But, some of the risk-encouragement in these compensation packages is by design. By human nature, managers can be inefficiently risk-averse, compared to investor preferences (since investors have a large diverse portfolio). So some 'flimsy random gains' might be a price investors are willing to pay to help offset other loss-aversion biases of managers.